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ABSTRACT 
SCOTT R. STEWART: Orphans, Poverty and Human Capital in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Under the direction of Sally Stearns and Sudhanshu Handa) 
 
 
This dissertation research informs our understanding of the social cost of 
HIV/AIDS as it relates to children. Specifically, I examine orphan status and 
poverty as potential sources of vulnerability in the development of human capital, 
and alternative strategies to mitigate their effects. Deficits in human capital 
among children can lead to reduced productivity as adults, and human capital 
deficits may transmit intergenerationally; hence, human capital is an important 
aspect of the social cost of HIV/AIDS. Cash transfers are one form of intervention 
that may mitigate the social cost of AIDS. My analysis compares nutritional status 
and school enrolment, as measures of vulnerability, between orphans and non-
orphans using OLS, fixed-effect and probit regressions. Micro-simulations are 
employed to compare the effects of alternative targeting strategies for cash 
transfer programs on consumption and school enrolment. The findings indicate 
that poverty is a more important source of vulnerability than orphan status and 
that targeting households with children explicitly offers greater benefits for the 
poorest children than targeting households that host elderly residents or 
households with labor constraints. Collectively, these findings suggest that 
presumptive targeting of orphans may not be warranted. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The overarching aim of this research is to assess the social costs of HIV/AIDS 
and the comparative effects of some efforts to mitigate it. AIDS is the number one cause 
of prime-age mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, and the region hosts approximately 25-30 
million orphans, one third of whom have lost a parent to the disease. AIDS related prime-
age adult mortality has led life expectancy rates to decline dramatically in the region and 
has severely weakened family support systems already stretched thin by extreme chronic 
poverty.  
The dimension of social costs on which I focus is the potential human capital 
losses – deficits in health and education – that might be expected to be incurred by AIDS 
orphans and children made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS, and strategies to address them. 
These are important questions for the economic development of countries severely 
affected by HIV/AIDS because deficits in human capital among children can lead to 
reduced productivity as adults, and human capital deficits may transmit 
intergenerationally. 
With this in mind, vulnerability and its implications for targeting provide the 
connective tissue for the three papers that follow. There are potential sources of 
vulnerability for children other than HIV/AIDS, e.g. poverty, absence from school, and 
insults to health. With all the attention and resources brought to bear on AIDS and 
orphans, an important question is whether it makes sense to target orphans because they 
are orphans, or to target children subject to broader sources of vulnerability. 
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Specifically, are orphans that much different from other children when other sources of 
vulnerability are considered? I find, in analysis of nutritional status, that orphans typically 
are not different from other children. Rather, household wealth is a stronger driver of 
nutritional status than orphan status.  
I then turn to comparative analysis of alternative targeting strategies under two 
forms of cash transfers that currently are under debate – in part from the lens of benefits 
to orphans and vulnerable children (OVC). Cash transfers are small, predictable 
payments to households from government, financed by the general budget and/or donor 
funds. The first program considered is a targeted cash transfer program with a fixed 
budget, targeted in the sense that it attempts to direct resources to the poorest of the poor 
based on eligibility criteria. The second is a universal cash grant that would provide 
transfers to any eligible household regardless of wealth.  
I find, using microsimulations and projection, that targeting households with 
children confers greater benefits on children. This may seem obvious, but some claimants 
in the current policy debate argue that OVC benefit substantially through programs that 
target households with labor constraints or households that host the elderly. The 
difference is in the denominator: they cite evidence that OVC comprise a large proportion 
of beneficiaries under alternative targeting strategies; I show that a large proportion of 
OVC would be missed because they do not reside in eligible households under these 
targeting strategies. 
This research provides a contribution by using large-sample, nationally 
representative data from multiple countries to inform current policy debates. Until now, 
sample sizes employed to analyze the relationship between nutritional status and orphan 
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hood have been much smaller, perhaps too small to detect a significant difference. 
Assessments of the welfare effects of cash transfer programs have been focused on small 
areas – the places in which they were piloted – but the potential benefits of national scale-
up should be considered before a final determination is made. 
Readers of this work are discouraged from over-interpreting the scope of its 
findings. The samples employed include OVC living in households. Human capital is 
treated as indicated by specific measures of health and education. Unconditional cash 
transfers – targeted or universal – are the only mechanism of assistance that is assessed.   
As this research employs large-scale household surveys, and so provides a 
contribution to the literature and current policy debates, the data limit observations on 
OVC to those living in households. Other vulnerable children, whether orphaned or not, 
may be missed in the analysis, e.g. street children, child soldiers, or those living in 
informal child-headed households that may be rather fluid. Child advocates have 
highlighted the plight of OVC living outside of the types of households that typically 
would be sampled in national surveys. This research is unable to comment. 
As often is stated, OVC may also live in households constituted only by elderly 
residents and children, the so-called “missing generation” households. These households 
lack prime-aged adults that might otherwise provide income to support OVC and, in 
result, have high dependency ratios. However, such households are observed with very 
little frequency in the data. Given the sampling frames and persistence required of data 
collection teams by survey protocols, there is little reason to assume that “missing 
generation” would systemically be omitted from the data. Their emphasis in the gray 
literature may instead be based on anecdotal evidence or small-area surveys.  
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It also is important to note that the direct comparison of orphans’ and non-
orphans’ nutritional status in this research is limited to samples of children aged 0-59 
months. Child-fostering is common in sub-Saharan Africa and it is plausible that younger 
orphans are more readily assimilated into households. If this is true, it would help to 
explain the difference between findings from my analysis of nutritional status, that there 
is no difference based on orphan status, and the general sense of the literature that 
differences do exist in education. Hence, this research informs but does not conclude the 
question whether orphans suffer human capital deficits, particularly since it finds no 
deficits in nutritional status. 
A valid question that arises in the context of OVC policy discussions is whether 
orphan hood, and assumptions that orphans fare more poorly, is a Western construct that 
does not apply in the sub-Sahara African context. Indeed, children from a household that 
is a poor producer of health may be better off with fostering after their parent’s death. 
Child-fostering is a longstanding, commonly held tradition in sub-Saharan Africa. Active 
fostering, i.e., placement of children in other households by their parents, may happen to 
promote the child’s opportunities, to provide labor in the fostering household, or to 
alleviate the burden of care for biological parents. But it seems unlikely that fostered 
children with living parents – who may act as advocates – would fare more poorly than 
those without. Hence, the question whether children who may not have parent-advocates, 
orphans, is of interest. Further, I do not attempt to assess potential psycho-social effects 
of orphan hood that may arise from experiencing the death of a parent. In any case, 
Western nations largely finance programs that target assistance to children based on 
orphan status alone, or use benefits to orphans as an evaluation measure. Comparison of 
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orphans and non-orphans is therefore appropriate in order to assess the relevance of 
policies.  
 CHAPTER II: NO WORSE THAN THEIR PEERS?  
ORPHANS’ NUTRITIONAL STATUS 
IN FIVE EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
Introduction 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region globally in which orphan prevalence – the 
proportion of children aged 0-15 who have lost at least one parent – is expected to rise in 
coming years. The number of orphans in sub-Saharan Africa has been projected to 
increase to 42 million by 2010 from an estimated 35 million at the beginning of the 
decade, due largely to parental death from AIDS. Children’s loss of a parent could inhibit 
their ability to develop the potential to lead productive lives as adults, particularly by 
limiting the investment available for health and education, the primary components of 
human capital. Children’s nutritional status is a key determinant of future potential. 
Better nutrition in early childhood has been linked to higher cognitive development and 
schooling outcomes, which enhance productivity. Stunting in early childhood diminishes 
adult height, which is positively correlated with wages. Hence, poor nutrition in early 
childhood results in lower returns to education beyond the more direct impact of poor 
nutrition on overall school attainment.    
Concern about lower schooling outcomes among orphans have resulted in policy 
decisions to direct resources to orphans, at times without regard to their socioeconomic 
status, on the assumption that orphans fare more poorly per se. There is increasing 
concern that such specific targeting results in a misallocation of resources because 
orphans’ outcomes are related more closely to living arrangements, 
which can affect orphans and non-orphans alike. If orphans fare more poorly because 
they are orphans, basing targeting criteria on orphan status would be appropriate. If, 
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however, orphans fare worse because their living arrangements confer constraints that 
also affect non-orphans, assistance should be targeted accordingly. 
This research investigates whether orphans’ existing living arrangements mediate 
relationships between orphan status and nutritional outcomes for children aged 0-59 
months, using recent Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from five East and 
Southern African countries with moderate to high HIV prevalence. Current evidence 
regarding a relationship between orphan status and anthropometric measures is sparse 
and inconclusive. Few previous studies have identified relationships between nutritional 
outcomes and orphan status and none have emphasized the potential for living 
arrangements to moderate observed relationships. Studies of orphans’ nutritional status 
from sub-Saharan Africa in particular are based on relatively small samples. The more 
recent DHS data employed for this study afford the advantages of increased sample size 
for nutritional comparisons as well as extensive measures of household demographics. 
Two questions are emphasized in this study: whether differences in nutritional 
status between orphans and non-orphans are observable in larger samples that offer 
greater statistical power, and whether observed effects are moderated by kinship ties and 
other characteristics of the households in which orphans live. Both these questions add 
value to the current state of knowledge on nutritional disparities between orphans and 
non-orphans, which is largely based on small samples and does not consider living 
arrangements as a confounding factor in determining orphan nutritional status. 
Why might orphans be nutritionally at risk? 
Orphans may be observed to have lower nutritional status than non-orphans for 
several reasons. It is possible that orphans have lower health endowments than non-
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orphans. Generally, this would seem implausible since most premature adult mortality in 
sub-Saharan Africa occurs as a result of accident, infectious disease, or other exogenous 
reasons. Diminished health endowment would be expected, however, if the orphan’s 
mother was HIV-positive at the time of birth and perinatal transmission occurred.  
Orphans may also exhibit lower nutritional status because of nutritional 
challenges that occurred prior to the event of their becoming an orphan. Two possible 
reasons exist for this explanation. Household responses to an adult member’s death could 
adversely affect the child. For example, if the deceased parent was chronically ill prior to 
death they may have been physically incapable of providing adequate care for the child. 
Similarly, household resources may have been diminished or diverted away from child 
feeding to provide care for the ill parent. Alternatively, household characteristics that are 
correlated with parental death may diminish the household’s propensity to provide 
adequate care for children, for example through risk-taking behavior, health knowledge 
or resource allocation.  
A child’s nutritional status could also be compromised after becoming an orphan. 
This would occur if orphans are fostered by poorer households or, in the case of single 
orphans, they remain living with the surviving parent and household resources (time and 
money) are diminished due to the loss of a productive adult, i.e., the parent who is 
deceased. Another reason that orphans may suffer nutritional challenges in their current 
situation is if household resource allocation decisions disfavor orphans, because the 
household’s returns to investment in the child are discounted or because of competition 
with natural children living in the same household.  
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If orphans have lower nutritional outcomes than their non-orphan peers, it would 
constitute a prima facie argument for policy intervention regardless of how the deficit 
occurred. Stunting is a very long-term effect of poor nutrition (WHO 1995; Cogill 2003), 
and because wages in adulthood may be associated with height (see e.g. Thomas & 
Strauss 1997) stunting could depress returns to education. Wasting may diminish long-
term health (Behrman et al. 2004). Child nutrition generally has been linked to cognitive 
development, and deficits in all of these factors – stature, health, cognitive ability – have 
been linked to educational attainment and productivity in adulthood (Behrman et al. 
2004; Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). The causal pathway of nutritional status would 
be of importance, however, to decisions regarding how to target policy interventions if 
they are warranted. 
Recent literature on health and living arrangements among orphans 
Health and nutrition 
The relationship between orphan status and children’s nutritional status in sub-
Saharan Africa has not been well established, and previous results regarding other health 
indicators are mixed. Three of four studies of orphan effects on anthropometrics 
generally found no effect. Two of the four were cross-sectional studies. Point estimates 
frequently were of conflicting sign and none of these were statistically significant 
(Ainsworth and Semali 2000; Lindblade et al. 2003; Crampin et al. 2003). The one 
exception within these studies was a finding based on cross-tabulations that the mean 
weight-for height z-score (WHZ) among orphans was 0.28 lower than that of non-
orphans (Lindblade et al. 2003). Each of these studies used data from East and Southern 
African countries, with sample sizes ranging 1,106 to 1,190. Ainsworth and Semali 
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(2000) used a four-wave panel structure and still obtained only 2,679 observations from 
1,108 children.  
In contrast, Gertler et al. (2003), found that maternal death between 1993 and 
1997 reduced the surviving child’s WHZ by 0.7 standard deviations and increased the 
probability of wasting, i.e., falling below a Z-score of –2, during the period by 14 
percentage points. Like Ainsworth and Semali (2000), Gertler et al. employ a child-level 
fixed effects model on two waves of data. Gertler’s sample, from Indonesia, is much 
larger for the WHZ analysis at 7,848 observations, but roughly similar in the wasting 
analysis at 2,176 observations. Hence, it is unclear whether Gertler et al. obtained 
different results because of larger sample size or because of substantial difference 
between the African and Indonesian settings. 
The morbidity impact of orphanhood has received very limited attention. In a 
study in Tanzania (Ainsworth and Semali 2000), the probability that a child was reported 
to be ill on the day of an interview increased by 16 percentage points if the child was a 
paternal orphan and by 27 percentage points if there had been an adult death within the 
household during the past six months. However, these results were fully attenuated if the 
household’s structure had a floor made of materials other than dirt. While this latter 
indicator was intended to proxy for wealth, the authors note that having a dirt floor 
increases the likelihood that a child ingests dirt, so these results may be spurious. 
Lindblade et al. (2003) find no association between orphan hood with a number of 
biomarkers including fever, hemoglobin and malaria parasitemia, as well as children’s 
history of diarrhea and respiratory illness in the two weeks prior to interview. Crampin et 
al. (2003) found no evidence of morbidity during follow-up. 
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Child mortality, on the other hand, demonstrates a consistent relationship with 
orphan status, although only two studies were identified that address the topic directly. 
Both studies find that maternal orphans have increased mortality risk and paternal 
orphans experience no effect (Crampin et al. 2003; Gertler 2003). Further, Crampin et al. 
find that while mortality risk from maternal death increases among children of HIV 
positive mothers, it does not for children of HIV negative mothers. However, 
generalization from this study is complex due to uncertainty regarding children’s HIV 
status. A related study of child mortality finds that the survival of children born during 
the five years preceding their analysis was enhanced by the degree of biological 
relatedness to adults within the household (Bishai et al. 2003). While this last study 
focuses on household structure and not orphan status per se, it suggests that orphans’ 
chances of survival improve when they are placed in households with greater numbers of 
closely related adults. 
Orphans’ living arrangements  
African orphans typically are not institutionalized in orphanages; rather, orphan 
care is community-based through a traditional system of fostering within the extended 
family or by others. Although some documentation (Nyambedha et al. 2003) indicates 
that the traditional system will be overtaxed by the region’s increasing orphan burden, 
policy makers discourage an institutional response because of concerns regarding quality 
of care, socialization back into the community, and costs (TvT Associates 2002).  
Case et al. (2004) found that “many maternal and paternal orphans are ‘virtual’ 
double orphans,” in the sense that their living arrangements do not include co-residence 
with the surviving parent. The range of point estimates for the East and Southern African 
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(ESA) countries in their sample indicates that roughly 69-90 percent of non-orphans in 
ESA countries lived with their mothers, while only 55-85 percent of paternal orphans did. 
Similarly, 44-75 percent of non-orphans lived with their fathers, but only 17-70 percent 
of maternal orphans did.  
The literature characterizes living arrangements for double orphans more 
explicitly. Double orphans in ESA countries tend to live in households headed by a 
relative. Double orphans live in households headed by grandparents at rates of 26-55 
percent, which is 2.5-3 times the rates at which non-orphans do (Bicego et al. 2003; 
Evans 2004), and in households headed by the orphan’s sibling at roughly a quarter to 
half the rate they live with grandparents (Ainsworth and Filmer 2002; Evans 2004). Other 
relatives make up the difference (Nyambedha et al. 2003; Evans 2004).  
Other characteristics of heads of households that host double orphans suggest 
potential vulnerability. On average, heads of households in which double orphans live 
have half a year less education than households with children who are not double orphans 
(Evans 2004a). Double orphans also are more likely to live in female-headed households 
and in households of which the head has no education, at rates of 36-52 percent and 32-
45 percent (up to 2.3 and 2.5 times those for non-orphans), respectively (Bicego et al. 
2003).  
Household structure notwithstanding, household wealth among double orphans 
compares favorably to that of non-orphans (Bicego et al. 2003; Case et al. 2004; Evans 
2004). Bicego et al. (2003) find that household wealth among double orphans is, on 
average, fairly similar to that of non-orphans. Pooling DHS data, Evans (2004) found that 
double orphans are slightly more likely than non-orphans to live in households with 
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electricity, with roughly equivalent structure quality (as measured by floor material), but 
with lower likelihood of having a toilet or latrine. Averaging estimates across DHS, Case 
et al. (2004) find that double orphans fare better than other orphans in terms of durable 
goods available within the household.  
Still, there is substantial variation in the wealth of households that host an orphan 
of any type. One study reports that poorer households tend to have higher concentrations 
of orphans (Ainsworth & Filmer 2002), but other evidence suggests a more nuanced 
picture, with household wealth being associated with orphan-type: Case et al. (2004) find 
that maternal orphans tend to live in households with wealth similar to that of households 
in which non-orphans live, but that paternal orphans live in households with lower 
wealth. Indeed, Case et al. conclude that the relatively poor household wealth associated 
with paternal orphans drives other findings that orphans generally live in poorer 
households. 
Evans (2004) finds that households fostering double orphans have 1.5 fewer 
children of all ages and 0.12 fewer children of the orphan’s gender and close to the 
orphan’s age. Further, he finds no evidence of negative effects from fostering on other 
members of the household, having tested for differences in educational outcomes and 
anthropometric measures among both children and female adults. From this, the study 
determines that households fostering double orphans are not disadvantaged, citing the 
result that the estimated effect of fostering an orphan on other household members is less 
than that of a new child. This suggests that orphans consume less, produce more, or both, 
relative to a natural child in the households in which they were fostered.  
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Data, methods, variables and hypotheses 
Data 
This research exploits adjustments made to recent Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) which permits collection of additional data on the nutritional status of 
orphans. The DHS make use of a multi-level questionnaire. Past DHS typically have 
collected anthropometric data through the individual woman’s questionnaire and, hence, 
only for children living with their biological mothers. Recent changes in the DHS have 
elevated anthropometrics to the household questionnaire, such that those data are 
available for all children living in the household. Hence, the more recent DHS data 
employed for this study afford the advantages of increased sample size for nutritional 
analysis of orphans, as well as  extensive measures of household demographics.  
The study data are drawn from DHS in five sub-Saharan African countries with 
moderate to high HIV prevalence: Kenya 2003 (7% adult HIV prevalence), Lesotho 2004 
(23%), Malawi 2004 (12%), Tanzania 2004 (7%), and Zambia 2002 (15%)1. Sample sizes 
from the four countries other than Lesotho range approximately 5,000 to 8,800 children 
aged 0-59 months. Lesotho’s sample of 1,700 observations is much smaller, but this 
country was included because of the possibility that its high HIV prevalence could 
exacerbate any effects that may be present more broadly. 
Variables 
Nutritional status typically is proxied by measures of physical status, or 
anthropometrics. Anthropometric indices are measured as z-scores for height-for-age 
(HAZ), weight-for-age (WAZ), and weight-for-height (WHZ). A child’s z-scores 
                                                            
1 HIV prevalence for Tanzania is estimated from the 2003 AIDS Indicator Survey, a modified version of 
the DHS. All other adult HIV prevalence rates listed are estimated from the corresponding DHS samples. 
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measure departure from the mean of a standard reference population in units of the 
reference population’s standard deviation. WHO has adopted reference curves from the 
U.S. National Center for Health Statistics as the international standard of comparison 
(WHO 1995). HAZ is generally interpreted as a measure of longer-term nutritional well-
being; low HAZ indicates nutritional challenges over a long period of time. And HAZ 
scores below –2 are generally interpreted to indicate “stunting,” which may cause 
permanent deficits in stature. WHZ is a more temporal measure of nutritional status. Low 
WHZ can result from temporary and thus more current nutritional challenges. WHZ 
below –2 generally indicate “wasting.” Deficits in WAZ can result both from long-term 
and current nutritional challenges and are better interpreted in the context of the other two 
indices (WHO 1995). Populations in developing countries typically demonstrate low 
HAZ. Hence, z-score comparisons must be made within the population under study; 
absolute measures offer little information (WHO 1995).2 
An orphan is any child with at least one deceased parent. Following Case et al. 
(2004), children with a parent whose survivorship was unknown also were treated as 
orphans, since that parent was unlikely to have provided any material or psycho-social 
support to the child. In the main analyses, orphan status is measured as part of a construct 
of child-type in accordance with whether the child lives in a blended household. A 
blended household is one in which both orphans and non-orphans live. A non-blended 
household has only orphans or only non-orphans. This yields four types of children: 
                                                            
2 For age-specific anthropometric indices, age is measured in days. Observations with biologically 
implausible indices are identified according to WHO guidelines (WHO 1995) and eliminated through case-
wise deletion.  
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orphans in blended household, orphans in non-blended households, non-orphans in 
blended households, and non-orphans in non-blended households.  
Sex and age of the child are used as child-level control variables in all models. 
These controls are important to include. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the probability of 
being an orphan increases with age among children aged 0-14 years (panel A), and z-
scores for anthropometric indices generally decrease with age (panel B). Omission of the 
age controls would then lead to an upward bias in estimates of the relationship between 
orphan status and under-nutrition. Age is specified as a construct of indicators for the 
child being of age 0-12 months, 13-24 months, and 25-59 months, allowing for variation 
in the relationship between age and anthropometrics. 
Wealth is measured as quintiles of household wealth within each survey’s entire 
distribution of households. Assignment to wealth quintiles is based on principal 
components analysis of a list of durable goods items available to responding households. 
Adult female education is a household characteristic that represents the amount of 
education available to the primary caretakers of children. It is measured as a continuous 
variable of years of education for the resident woman in the household above age 17 with 
the highest educational attainment. Other specifications were investigated, such as mean 
female education in the household, but these had little effect on the results.  
A construct of three other household demographic measures offer a proxy for the 
time available for child tending. These include the number of women of reproductive age 
(15-49), the number of women aged 50-70, and the children below the age of 13 years. 
The two age groups for adult females were separated to allow flexibility in the intensity 
of time-inputs that members of each group would provide for child tending. Finally, two 
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indicator variables are used for the children’s relationship to household head, yielding 
three groups: child of the household head, grandchild, or other relative. The numbers of 
children living in other households, such as those headed by a sibling, were too small to 
be included in the analysis and were eliminated by case-wise deletion (e.g. ranging from 
one observation in Lesotho to twelve in Kenya).  
Methods 
Econometric methods are used to estimate the orphan ‘effect’ on nutritional status 
of children under 60 months of age in each of the 5 countries. In the baseline models, an 
OLS regression is used to estimate the relationship between a child’s orphan status and 
their z-scores for height-for-age, weight-for-height, and weight-for-age controlling only 
for age and sex, as shown in equation (1).  
 
 
 
Overlapping sets of indicators are then introduced to assess the extent to which 
different measures of living arrangements modify the baseline relationship between 
orphan status and nutritional status as summarized by β1 in equation (1). These additional 
control variables include measures of household wealth, the educational status of adult 
females in the household, other household demographics, and relationship of the child to 
the household head. Of these living arrangements variables, relationship to household 
head is the only one that may vary across children within the same household. Hence, the 
OLS model with full controls for living arrangements can be expressed as follows: 
(1) 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) hihihhhhihihihi reldemoedfwagesexorphanZ ,,4321,3,2,1, _ εδδδδβββα ++++++++=
( ) ( ) ( ) iiiii agesexorphanZ εβββα ++++= 321
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where orphan is a set of indicators of orphan status and/or child-type; sex and age are 
indicators of the sex and age group of the child under observation; w is set of indicators 
for wealth status; f_ed is a measure of educational attainment among female adults in the 
household; demo is a construct of other household demographics including the number of 
women of reproductive age, older women, and children under age 13; and rel is an 
indicator of the child’s relationship to the head of the household. The epsilon (ε) is a 
random error term assumed to be i.i.d. normal, with mean zero. Standard error estimates 
in all models are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering. The subscripts i and h 
refer to individuals and households, respectively.  
In addition to OLS, household fixed effects (FE) models are employed to test for 
differences between orphans and non-orphans living in the same household. These 
models control for unobserved household characteristics that could be correlated both 
with orphan status and nutritional outcomes. For example, if households in which both 
orphans and non-orphans live have a greater propensity to care for children and these 
households also produce better nutritional outcomes, it could mask underlying nutritional 
differences that exist between orphans and non-orphans. These unobserved household 
characteristics that do not differ across children living in the same household are 
represented in the following equation by the term μh: 
 
 
In estimation, the term μh is represented as a dummy variable for each household 
and hence controls for unobserved characteristics that vary between households. Note 
that all household level variables (i.e variables that do not vary within the household but 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) hihhihhihihihi relorphanwagesexorphanZ ,,41,3,2,1, * εμδδβββα +++++++=
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are the same for each and every person within the household) drop out of the FE model. 
As a result, differences between orphans and non-orphans cannot be identified in 
households that include only one or the other--all of the difference in nutritional status 
between orphans and non-orphans identified by the household fixed effects model is due 
to within-household variation, and these estimates only include blended households. A a 
result, the term w*orphan is included in the FE models. This interaction is necessary to 
identify to the mediating effect of wealth on orphan status, since wealth would be 
excluded from the fixed effect estimations since it is a household characteristic that does 
not vary across children within the same household. 
Hypotheses 
Of interest is whether orphans below the age of 60 months have significantly 
lower anthropometric indices than non-orphans, and whether the relationship between 
orphan status and nutritional status is moderated by children’s living arrangements. 
Several testable hypotheses emerge from the foregoing discussion to address these 
research questions. The primary hypothesis is that orphan status and anthropometrics are 
negatively related. The relationship may be small due to the relatively low probability 
that young-aged children are orphans. As evidenced by Figure 1, the probability of being 
an orphan increases substantially with age, but exhibits little variation relative to that of 
anthropometric indices below the age of five years and particularly below the age of 
about 24 months.. Still, a relationship between orphan status and nutritional outcomes is 
hypothesized to be detectable by the samples employed here, which exceed those of 
previous studies by up to eight times.  
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Further, orphans’ living arrangements are hypothesized to mediate their 
nutritional outcomes. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the relationship between orphan 
status and anthropometric indices will become more positive with three measures of 
living arrangements: increasing wealth, increasing adult female education, and higher 
numbers of adult women, controlling for the number of children. More distant 
relationships between children and household head are hypothesized to negatively affect 
the relationship between orphan status and nutritional outcomes, such that living in a 
household headed by one’s grandparent will result in lower nutritional status, and living 
in households headed by other relatives will lower nutritional still.  
Results 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the outcome and control variables used in 
the regression analysis. Orphan prevalence in the study samples ranges from 3-17 percent 
(line 1). Orphan prevalence is highest in Lesotho, which also has the highest adult 
prevalence of HIV (23%). The next higher orphan prevalence is that of Kenya, at six 
percent. In all countries except Lesotho, half or more of the orphans live in blended 
households; in Lesotho, just over one-third of orphans live in blended households. These 
observations are consistent with the general hypothesis that drives presumptive targeting 
of orphans for assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, i.e., that traditional mechanisms of 
orphan care – fostering by households that already have children – may be deteriorating 
in the face of increasing HIV/AIDS prevalence and that orphans suffer as result. 
As demonstrated by the summary statistics in Table 1, orphans indeed have lower 
anthropometric indices on average than non-orphans, for all measures in all of the study 
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countries. The challenge, then, is to determine whether the observed differences are 
significant, and to identify their determinants. Simple t-tests of differences between 
groups indicate that only the orphan/non-orphan difference in height-for-age from 
Tanzania is significant at α = 0.05. Differences in weight-for-age from Malawi and 
Tanzania, and in weight-for-height from Kenya and Zambia, are significant at α = 0.10. 
However, as noted earlier and confirmed in Table 1, orphans are older than non-
orphans: mean age among orphans is 5 to 8 months higher than among non-orphans. The 
full sample means are 35 months among orphans and 28 among non-orphans, for a mean 
difference of seven months. This age difference could be driving the mean differences in 
anthropometry because nutritional status, particularly HAZ, worsens with age among pre-
school children. It is thus of extreme importance to control for these differences in age 
when estimating the true orphan ‘effect’. 
There is some tendency for orphans to live in households with slightly lower adult 
female education and more elder women, though these differences are small. No 
consistent pattern of differences between orphans and non-orphans exists in the number 
of women of reproductive age or children in the household.  
Relationship to household head demonstrates the starkest differences: orphans are 
much more likely to live in a household headed by a grandparent than non-orphans. At 
first look, this would appear natural since orphans are defined as having a deceased 
parent. But the orphan definition does not require that both parents are dead and there are 
relatively few double orphans in these samples. Surviving parents could maintain their 
previous headship status or adopt that of their deceased partner, though a substantial 
number clearly are not doing so. As is demonstrated by the regression analysis below, 
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living in a household headed by one’s grandparent can significantly affect a child’s 
nutritional status, but this is not uniformly the case.  
Table 1 also shows the distribution of children across the wealth quintiles. In only 
Malawi is there more than a 3 percentage point difference in the prevalence of orphans in 
the poorest quintile (31.5 versus 18.9 percent for orphans and and-orphans respectively). 
In Kenya the prevalence of orphans in the poorest quintile is actually marginally lower 
for orphans (22.6 percent) relative to non-orphans (24.6 percent). On the other hand, in 
both Kenya and Lesotho orphans are significantly less likely to appear in the richest 
quintile, but this does not hold for the other 3 countries. The idea that orphans are 
clustered among the poorest households is not borne out by these data, although the focus 
here is on a very young age group, where overall orphan prevalence is low.  
In summary, while orphans do appear to have worse average nutritional outcomes 
relative to non-orphans, they also display significantly different personal characteristics 
(age) and live in households which are also different in terms of relationship to head and 
demographic composition. These differences could be driving the mean differences in 
nutritional status reported in Table 1, thus warranting the use of multivariate regression 
analysis to control for such differences and isolate the orphan ‘effect’. 
Baseline results 
Estimates from the baseline regression (equation 1) were performed for each of 
the 3 nutritional indicators in each of the 5 countries, resulting in 15 possible effects of 
orphan status on nutrition, controlling only for age and sex of the child. For ease of 
exposition the estimates of β1 are shown in Figure 2 along with their 90 percent 
confidence interval to assess statistical difference from 0. The signs on the coefficient 
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estimates were inconsistent. The estimates range as broadly as –0.12 to 0.09 in models of 
height-for-age and as narrowly as +/–0.03 in models of weight-for-age, with standard 
errors on are the order of 0.09 and 0.07, respectively. The confidence interval for each 
and every estimate includes zero, indicating no significant orphan effect after controlling 
for age and sex. Hence the mean differences depicted in Table 1 are purely attributable to 
differences in age between orphans and non-orphans, since orphans are older and 
nutritional status deteriorates with age. 
Main OLS results on orphan effects 
The main models specify children in four groups depending on whether they are 
orphans or non-orphans and whether they live in a blended household, i.e., in a household 
that includes both orphan and non-orphan children. The analysis is organized as follows. 
For each nutritional indicator, a base model is estimated which includes only these three 
indicator variables—non-orphans in non-blended households are the omitted category 
and hence the reference group to which the estimates are compared. This base model is 
then augmented by adding increasingly more control variables to see whether these 
modify the baseline estimates: 1) including controls for wealth; 2) including controls for 
female education; 3) including controls for time-use or care-giving potential within the 
household; 4) including controls for relationship of the child to the head of the household. 
Thus for each outcome there are 5 models, the baseline plus these four. 
The presentation of results is organized by nutritional outcome and the key orphan 
related coefficient estimates are summarized in Tables 2A (HAZ), 2B (WAZ) and 2C 
(WHZ) by model and country. Full results of each model for each outcome and country 
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(5 models, 5 countries, 3 outcomes for a total of 75 regression models) are provided in 
the appendces for the enthusiastic reader.  
Results for HAZ across models: Table 2A shows the orphan related estimates for 
HAZ for the 5 models by country. Statistically significant estimates are in bold—thee 
indicate a non-random difference between the relevant type of child and the reference 
group (non-orphans in non-blended households). There are two orphan indicators in each 
model (those in blended and non-blended households) which gives a total of 50 orphan 
related coefficient estimates in Table 2A (2 per regression, 5 regressions per country, 5 
countries). Only 4 of these 50 coefficients are statistically significant, and all of these are 
in Kenya. Moreover the point estimates are positive indicating that orphans in non-
blended households in Kenya have better HAZ relative to the reference group. In column 
2 for example, the point estimate indicates that these orphans are on average 0.283 z-
scores taller than non-orphans in non-blended households.  The fact that this point 
estimate increases slightly between model 2 and models 3-5 indicates that the distribution 
of the additional control variables are worse in orphan households (i.e they serve to 
depress child nutritional status in orphan households). When control is made for these, 
orphans in non-blended households actually do even better than non-orphans in non-
blended households.    
Results for WAZ across models: Summary results for WAZ are presented in 
Table 2B and follow the same format as in Table 2A. For this nutritional outcome, not 
one single orphan related coefficient is statistically significant, indicating no difference in 
average WAZ between orphans in any type of household and non-orphans in non-blended 
households. The effects that are significant relate to non-orphans in blended households; 
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in Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania these children tend to have higher WAZ relative to non-
orphans in non-blended households, with the largest differences observed in Kenya. For 
example, in column (3), non-orphans in blended households have higher WAZ by about 
0.15 (Kenya), 0.088 (Malawi) and 0.098 (Tanzania) z-scores respectively. 
Results for WHZ across models: Summary results for WHZ are shown in Table 
2C which also follows the same format as the previous two tables. Again, not one of the 
50 orphan related coefficient estimates are statistically different from 0, indicating that 
orphans are no worse off than non-orphans in non-blended households in terms of 
average WHZ. As in Table 2B, non-orphans in blended households seem to have an 
advantage over non-orphans in non-blended households, particularly in Tanzania where 
statistical significance is found in 4 of the 5 models.  
Main results on effects of living arrangements and household characteristics 
The coefficient estimates demonstrating the effects of individual household and 
demographic factors, including living arrangements, are shown in the tables in the 
appendices. The main results are summarized here.  
Wealth: Increasing wealth generally is associated with better nutritional status, 
except that wealth demonstrates little influence on weight-for-height in the four countries 
other than Kenya. This may be expected however since WHZ can be a volatile measure 
as it easily is affected by temporary illness. Children living in households in the two 
highest wealth quintiles fare particularly well with respect to height-for-age and weight-
for-age, which may be expected since these are measures of longer-term well-being. 
Children living in these wealthier households score better than children in the poorest 
households on height-for-age and weight-for-age indices by 0.2 – 0.6 standard deviations. 
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In Tanzania the difference is as high as 0.8 standard deviations in height-for-age (Table 
4A, columns 2-5). These results demonstrate that household wealth is the single most 
important determinant of nutritional status of resident children. 
Female adult education: A year of education among adult females in the 
household, measured from the individual female member with highest attainment, has a 
small positive marginal effect on nutritional status. Coefficient estimates on this variable 
typically are significant, ranging 0.01 to 0.05 (see column 3 in Tables 1-5 in the 
appendices). If the difference between completion of secondary school and never starting 
secondary school is five years, this translates into differences in nutritional status of 0.05 
– 0.25 standard deviations per year of schooling. The full results indicate that adult 
female education and wealth are positively correlated, since the wealth coefficients tend 
to decrease when female education is added to the model, yet each variable remains 
significant, indicating that they are capturing different dimensions of household capacity 
to produce child health.  
Demographics: Controlling for wealth and adult female education, ambiguous 
results were obtained from the construct of household demographics that proxy for time 
available for childcare: numbers of women of reproductive age, elder women aged 50-70, 
and children aged less than 13 years (column 4 in Tables 1-5 of the appendices). 
Coefficients on women of reproductive age were significant only in models from Kenya 
and Zambia, of magnitude ranging 0.04 – 0.08. The coefficients on elder women were 
significant only in Tanzania, and ranged up to 0.13. Similarly, the number of children 
aged below 13 was negatively associated with nutritional status and significant in Kenya 
and Zambia, with coefficient ranging 0.02 – 0.05 in magnitude. In contrast, this 
27 
 
coefficient was positive and significant in models of height- and weight-for-age from 
Tanzania, indicating an advantage of roughly 0.03 standard deviations (column 4 of 
Tables 4A and 4B).  
Relationship to head: Relationship of the child to household head was examined 
in models with full controls for other measures of living arrangements (column 5 of 
Tables 1-5 in the appendices). This analysis also presents somewhat mixed results. In 
most models, children living in households headed by their grandparent demonstrated no 
difference from those living in households headed by their parent. Children living in 
grandparent-headed households do have poorer nutritional status in models of height- and 
weight-for-age in Tanzania (column 5 of Tables 4A and 4B), and weight-for-age and 
weight-for-height in Zambia (column 5 of Tables 5B and 5C), with negative coefficient 
estimates ranging in magnitude from 0.10 – 0.13. The single case in which such children 
fared better was with regard to weight-for-age in Malawi, where the difference was less 
than 0.09 standard deviations. Hence, taken together, these models indicate that children 
living in grandparent-headed households generally are no worse off than children living 
in households headed by their parents, when controlling for wealth and adult female 
education.  
Household fixed effects  
Household fixed effect models were implemented as a direct test of whether 
orphans and non-orphans differ in nutritional status when living in the same household. 
By their nature, these models provide a complete set of controls for unobserved 
household characteristics that may affect young children’s nutritional status. Three 
specifications were employed. The baseline model controls for children’s sex and age 
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(column 6 in the appended Tables). Household wealth is then interacted with the 
indicator of whether the child is an orphan (column 7 in appended tables). Finally, 
indicators for the child’s relationship to household head – whether the head of household 
is a grandparent or other relative – are added to the model (column 8 in appended tables).  
These models fail to yield statistically significant estimates on orphan status in 
virtually all specifications. The controls for living arrangements offer little additional 
insight. Though the addition of controls for living arrangements appears to affect the 
estimates on orphan status in two cases out of 45 (weight-for-age in Kenya and height-
for-age in Malawi), coefficients on the controls are not statistically significant. 
Coefficients on the interactions of wealth and orphan status are never significant and are 
inconsistent in sign, which agrees rather well with the findings of Case et al. (2004) who 
examine this interaction in the context of orphan schooling. In models from Kenya and 
Zambia only, child-level controls for relationship to household head exhibit a statistically 
significant negative relationship between living in a household headed by one’s 
grandparent and nutritional status, relative to children in households headed by their 
parents. The relationship is strong, with magnitudes of approximately 0.3 standard 
deviations in Zambia (column 8 of Tables 5A and 5B) and 0.5 in Kenya (column 8 of 
Tables 1A, 1B and 1C). In the Zambian case, the estimates on living with another relative 
are even more negative, at about 0.4 standard deviations. For these few cases, the results 
are strongly suggestive of a discrimination explanation since the comparison is to 
children in the same household but whose parents are the household head. Still, these 
findings occur in only two of the five countries under analysis. No difference is observed 
due to relationship to household head in other fixed effect models. 
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Children in relative poverty 
It is possible that the relationship between orphan status and nutritional outcomes 
is different in poorer households than in the overall sample, for example due to more 
restrictive household resource constraints. Figure 3 shows the proportion of orphans and 
non-orphans who live in households in the bottom two wealth quintiles. There is no clear 
pattern to indicate that orphans are over-represented in poorer households relative to non-
orphans. Indeed, the results of t-tests on the proportion of each country sub-sample living 
in a household in the bottom two wealth quintiles reveals a statistically significant 
difference only in the case of Malawi. 
The entire set of 75 OLS regression models (5 models, 3 indicators, 5 countries) 
were re-estimated using only the bottom 2 quintiles (the poorest 40% of the sample). A 
sub-set of these results is summarized in Table 3 for cases where the results are different 
from the full-sample ones. In 3 countries and for some outcomes, there is a statistically 
significant and negative orphan effect in the poorest 40% of the sample.  
  The strongest results supporting orphan deficits in this sub-sample are in HAZ 
from Zambia and Tanzania. Table 3 shows that in the fully-specified models (column 5), 
orphans in blended households are 0.549 (Tanzania) and 0.256 (Zambia) z-scores shorter 
than non-orphans in non-blended households. In Kenya orphans in blended households 
also have significantly lower z-scores of WHZ (of around 0.3), although this difference is 
no longer statistically significant when controls for relationship to head are included in 
the regression (Column 5). In this fully controlled model, the coefficient on living in a 
household headed by a grandparent is –0.231 and statistically significant. This indicates 
that in Kenya, orphans in relatively poor, blended households are worse off because they 
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tend to live in grandparent-headed households. While the data do not allow a direct test of 
intra-household resource allocation, this finding is consistent with discrimination against 
orphans based on distance in kinship ties. For example, the de facto heads of these 
households may be aunts or uncles of the orphans and tend to favor their own children in 
resource allocation decisions. In household FE models for this sample, which compares 
orphans and non-orphans in the same households, there are no significant differences 
between the two groups of children (results available from the author). This indicates that 
blended households in the lower two quintiles of wealth are systematically worse off in 
terms of their ability to produce child nutrition. Note also that for HAZ in Kenya, orphans 
in non-blended households actually have an even larger nutritional advantage (by 0.5 z-
scores) over non-orphans in non-blended households compared to the full sample results 
reported in Table 2A.   
Discussion 
Summary of main results 
The analyses presented herein were undertaken on the hypothesis that differences 
exist in nutritional status between orphans and non-orphans in sub-Saharan Africa, but 
had gone undetected due to limitations on sample size in previous studies. Sample sizes 
in previous studies ranged from 1,100 to 1,200 children, while samples in this study 
range from 1,700 in Lesotho to 8,500 in Malawi. Models of height-for-age, weight-for-
age and weight-for-height were estimated using data from five countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa with samples up to seven times those employed in previous research.  
The picture that emerges is more complex than originally anticipated. The 
analyses indicate that orphans generally do not suffer poorer nutritional outcomes than 
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non-orphans. Rather household wealth in particular, and in some cases relationship to 
household head, are the important determinants of nutritional status. Other aspects of 
living arrangements confer advantages or disadvantages on the nutritional status of the 
average child as might be expected, but inconsistently so and to less extent. These general 
outcomes do not hold in certain settings – orphans in blended households were worse off 
in Tanzania in terms of height-for-age, and orphans in non-blended households were 
better off in Kenya – but these exceptions reinforce the more general finding that there is 
not a consistent negative relationship between orphan status and nutrition.  
Somewhat surprisingly, non-orphans in blended households were found to be 
better off than non-orphans in non-blended households in three of the five countries 
under analysis. This suggests that households that host orphans in these countries have 
greater capacity to care for children, at least in terms of the living arrangements measured 
in these models. Indeed, this effect was observed in Kenya, where orphans in non-
blended households also were observed to experience better nutritional outcomes, 
suggesting that non-orphans in non-blended households in that country live in households 
that are particularly ineffective producers of child nutrition. 
Possible explanation for findings 
Young-aged orphans may fare relatively well because they are more easily 
assimilated by host households. In many societies young children are more likely to be 
adopted than older children. If all young children in the household “eat from the same 
pot,” i.e., there are economies of scale in the household production of child feeding, then 
one would expect to observe little difference between orphans and non-orphans with the 
similar health endowments in the same household. Though some evidence was found to 
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suggest within-household discrimination against orphans, this was not a general result. If 
discrimination in intrahousehold resource allocation exists based on kinship-ties, and if 
this stems from expected future remittances from the child to household decision makers, 
the latter may find it more efficient to nurture strength of relationship when they take in a 
child at an earlier age. 
It is possible that differences in nutritional status between orphans and non-
orphans exist but simply are not observable at young ages. The probability of being an 
orphan and of suffering nutritional deficits that translate into anthropometric indices both 
increase with age. This limits the power of a sample of very young children to detect 
relationships between them – a commonly held limitation of studies of orphans and 
nutrition (Greenblott & Greenaway 2007) – particularly so in models with household 
fixed effects. The fixed effect models exclude orphans and non-orphans in non-blended 
households, which were found in some OLS specifications to be important groups. More 
generally, the standard errors in fixed effect models with added controls increase 
dramatically, which suggests that the sizes of sub-samples relating to these categories are 
too small to support such detailed analysis.  
Analyses using cross-sectional data frequently are criticized for their inability to 
support causal inference when regression results indicate a relationship between 
outcomes (e.g nutritional or schooling status) and the independent variables of interest 
(e.g orphan status). In the current study, the findings on orphan status typically are that no 
such relationship exists. Failure of the cross-sectional data to detect a negative 
relationship between orphan status and nutrition if one truly exists would require that 
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orphans systematically start their childhoods with better nutritional status or are more 
resilient than non-orphans, both of which seem implausible. 
Key policy implications 
The key finding in this study is that the impact of orphan status per se on 
nutritional outcomes is weak or non-existent after controlling for wealth, kinship and age. 
These results confirm the findings of previous analyses, based on much smaller samples, 
that young orphans may not be worse off nutritionally than non-orphans. While orphan 
deficits are observed in some instances for some outcomes, the single most important 
factor determining nutritional status is household wealth.   
The key implication is that policies of presumptive targeting of assistance to 
orphans to improve nutritional status would not be warranted. Rather, the identification of 
vulnerable children and their targeting for assistance should be based on indicators of 
poverty. That more examples of a significant relationship between orphan status and 
nutrition are found among poorer households further supports this conclusion: increasing 
wealth or, by extension, income among those households would apparently mitigate that 
relationship. 
While orphans’ kinship ties to the household head is important in some cases, 
using this as an indicator for targeting would require the delivery of assistance to the 
child directly, since assistance to the household may not confer the desired benefit to the 
more distantly related orphan. Further research using data that supports direct tests of 
intra-household resource allocation would help to tease out the origins of differences in 
nutritional status related to kinship with household head, as well as the occasional deficits 
observed among orphans living with non-orphans in poorer households. More important, 
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however, is the need for analysis that would project differences in the returns to targeting 
strategies based on poverty, orphan status or other criteria.   
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Table 2.2A: Summary regression results of effect of child-type on HAZ  
Controls included in model:* baseline wealth 
Female 
education demographics 
relationship 
to head 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
KENYA      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.036 0.001 0.019 0.003 0.007 
(0.120) (0.122) (0.118) (0.121) (0.125) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.259 0.283 0.313 0.312 0.290 
(0.133) (0.134) (0.135) (0.137) (0.140) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.072 0.081 0.088 0.079 0.111 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.088) (0.089) 
Observations 5028 5028 4977 4977 4938 
LESOTHO      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.012 0.058 0.051 0.107 0.103 
(0.149) (0.151) (0.151) (0.157) (0.159) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.015 0.042 0.058 0.049 0.051 
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households -0.016 0.005 -0.003 0.031 0.04 
(0.088) (0.086) (0.086) (0.092) (0.096) 
Observations 1721 1721 1718 1718 1711 
MALAWI      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.047 0.027 -0.028 -0.024 -0.038 
(0.131) (0.129) (0.123) (0.126) (0.132) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households -0.057 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.008 
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) (0.105) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.093 0.039 0.049 0.051 0.042 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.052) 
Observations 8629 8629 8552 8552 8378 
TANZANIA      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.162 -0.184 -0.185 -0.229 -0.234 
(0.127) (0.121) (0.120) (0.118) (0.125) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households -0.03 0.036 0.073 0.091 0.113 
(0.139) (0.135) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.097 0.042 0.041 -0.018 -0.007 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Observations 7910 7910 7851 7851 7643 
ZAMBIA      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.022 -0.004 -0.034 0.011 0.015 
(0.101) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.101) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.183 0.166 0.155 0.164 0.159 
(0.166) (0.163) (0.169) (0.170) (0.184) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.036 -0.019 -0.055 -0.011 -0.024 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.054) 
Observations 5806 5806 5762 5762 5659 
 * (1) Baseline model includes age and sex only; models (2)-(5) include age and sex plus the set of variables indicated at 
the top of the column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in bold are significant at p < 0.05. See 
Appendix A for full results of all models.  
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Table 2.2B: Summary regression results of effect of child-type on WAZ  
Controls included in model:* Baseline wealth 
Female 
education demographics 
relationship 
to head 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
KENYA      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.074 -0.045 -0.056 -0.049 -0.015 
(0.101) (0.102) (0.098) (0.099) (0.103) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.13 0.158 0.212 0.210 0.202 
(0.118) (0.117) (0.112) (0.116) (0.119) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.149 0.156 0.151 0.170 0.203 
(0.077) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.077) 
Observations 5112 5112 5061 5061 5022 
LESOTHO      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.021 0.066 0.054 0.096 0.085 
(0.140) (0.139) (0.138) (0.146) (0.148) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.012 0.041 0.06 0.054 0.047 
(0.093) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.095) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.08 0.1 0.087 0.112 0.101 
(0.079) (0.078) (0.077) (0.084) (0.085) 
Observations 1752 1752 1749 1749 1741 
MALAWI      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.07 0.051 0.033 0.029 0.007 
(0.099) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.104) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households -0.071 -0.022 -0.019 -0.019 -0.013 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.129 0.094 0.088 0.085 0.079 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
Observations 8888 8888 8808 8808 8625 
TANZANIA      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.017 0.003 -0.013 -0.044 0 
(0.091) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.103) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households -0.05 -0.011 -0.01 0.007 0.023 
(0.112) (0.109) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.123 0.092 0.098 0.054 0.069 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) 
Observations 7971 7971 7912 7912 7703 
ZAMBIA      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.043 0.024 0.004 0.028 0.062 
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.082) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.02 0.011 0.02 0.029 0.083 
(0.114) (0.113) (0.118) (0.121) (0.129) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.006 -0.035 -0.056 -0.024 -0.015 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) 
Observations 5969 5969 5925 5925 5822 
 * (1) Baseline model includes age and sex only; models (2)-(5) include age and sex plus the set of variables 
indicated at the top of the column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in bold are significant at p 
< 0.05. See Appendix A for full results of all models.  
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Table 2.2C: Summary regression results of effect of child-type on WHZ  
Controls included in model:* baseline wealth 
Female 
education demographics 
relationship 
to head 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
KENYA      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.097 -0.091 -0.128 -0.114 -0.084 
(0.095) (0.093) (0.092) (0.094) (0.096) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households -0.051 -0.039 0.022 0.013 0.017 
(0.109) (0.107) (0.103) (0.105) (0.110) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.099 0.101 0.094 0.126 0.141 
(0.071) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) 
Observations 5192 5192 5134 5134 5095 
LESOTHO      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.001 0.016 0.012 0.033 0.012 
(0.130) (0.128) (0.129) (0.139) (0.140) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.028 0.04 0.054 0.054 0.042 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.087) (0.088) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.105 0.114 0.104 0.118 0.09 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.080) (0.082) 
Observations 1780 1780 1776 1776 1768 
MALAWI      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.01 0.009 0.02 0.017 -0.026 
(0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.103) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households -0.031 -0.021 -0.017 -0.016 -0.041 
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.086) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.083 0.085 0.070 0.068 0.061 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
Observations 8892 8892 8812 8812 8626 
TANZANIA      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.072 0.073 0.055 0.042 0.085 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.093) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.021 0.017 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.080 0.082 0.089 0.075 0.082 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) 
Observations 8016 8016 7957 7957 7744 
ZAMBIA      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.07 -0.072 -0.074 -0.076 -0.05 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.076) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households -0.157 -0.155 -0.139 -0.134 -0.064 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.123) (0.124) (0.132) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households -0.006 -0.012 -0.012 -0.006 0.011 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
Observations 6029 6029 5985 5985 5880 
 * (1) Baseline model includes age and sex only; models (2)-(5) include age and sex plus the set of variables indicated 
at the top of the column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in bold are significant at p < 0.05. See 
Appendix A for full results of all models.  
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Table 2.3: Selected OLS results of effect of child-type on nutrition for households in lower two wealth 
quintiles 
Controls included in model:* baseline wealth 
Female 
education demographics 
relationship 
to head 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
KENYA: height-for-age      
Orphans in Blended Households 0.045 0.04 0.108 0.134 0.044 
(0.204) (0.204) (0.191) (0.193) (0.200) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.519 0.516 0.531 0.554 0.536 
(0.192) (0.193) (0.197) (0.199) (0.208) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households -0.038 -0.041 -0.013 0.001 0.003 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.123) (0.125) 
Observations 2219 2219 2196 2196 2185 
KENYA: weight-for-age      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.11 -0.127 -0.09 -0.086 -0.043 
(0.142) (0.142) (0.128) (0.132) (0.139) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.283 0.276 0.367 0.347 0.350 
(0.193) (0.193) (0.181) (0.184) (0.191) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.172 0.168 0.183 0.186 0.212 
(0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.108) (0.112) 
Observations 2266 2266 2243 2243 2232 
KENYA: weight-for-height      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.279 -0.291 -0.308 -0.304 -0.215 
(0.132) (0.135) (0.125) (0.126) (0.132) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households -0.048 -0.059 0.052 0.027 0.042 
(0.180) (0.180) (0.162) (0.166) (0.175) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.156 0.155 0.159 0.161 0.183 
(0.103) (0.101) (0.099) (0.102) (0.104) 
Observations 2298 2298 2272 2272 2261 
TANZANIA height-for-age      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.440 -0.441 -0.444 -0.510 -0.549 
(0.184) (0.185) (0.185) (0.180) (0.176) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.014 0.013 0.04 0.071 0.092 
(0.208) (0.208) (0.214) (0.213) (0.215) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.062 0.062 0.052 -0.044 -0.043 
(0.071) (0.071) (0.069) (0.070) (0.072) 
Observations 3288 3288 3259 3259 3189 
ZAMBIA height-for-age      
Orphans in Blended Households -0.266 -0.264 -0.275 -0.253 -0.256 
(0.129) (0.129) (0.131) (0.134) (0.144) 
Orphans in Non-Blended Households 0.333 0.338 0.304 0.328 0.303 
(0.249) (0.250) (0.251) (0.254) (0.264) 
Non-Orphans in Blended Households 0.02 0.018 -0.005 0.022 -0.013 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.095) (0.094) 
Observations 2781 2781 2764 2764 2717 
 * (1) Baseline model includes age and sex only; models (2)-(5) include age and sex plus the set of variables 
indicated at the top of the column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in bold are significant at p < 
0.05. Full results available from author.   
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Figure 2.1A: Orphan prevalence among children aged 0 – 14 years, by country 
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Figure 2.1B: Age-specific anthropometric indices among children aged 0-59 months, all countries 
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Figure 2.3: Proportion of orphans and non-orphans living in households in lower two wealth quintiles, 
among children aged 0-59 months 
Notes: “0” = non-orphan; “1” = orphan 
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Figure 2.2: Coefficient estimates and 90% confidence intervals for orphan effects controlling for age and sex 
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CHAPTER III: REACHING OVC THROUGH CASH TRANSFERS  
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SIMULATION RESULTS  
FROM ALTERNATIVE TARGETING SCHEMES 
 
 
Introduction 
Social cash transfers (CTs), small predictable sums of money to poor and 
vulnerable families, are a relatively new social protection instrument in East and 
Southern Africa (ESA). However this instrument is rapidly gaining popularity as an 
effective intervention to enhance the participation of the poor in economic development, 
and to combat inequality, social exclusion and chronic poverty. In the HIV and AIDS 
policy dialogue in particular, the ‘protective’ dimension of programming in the 4 Ps 
increasingly calls for the use of social cash transfers to support families that care for 
orphans and other children affected by AIDS (UNICEF AND UNAIDS 2004). Advocacy 
among AIDS scholars for such programs is driven by the fact that AIDS is the number 
one cause of prime-age mortality in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and the region hosts 
approximately 25-30 million orphans, one third of whom have lost a parent to the disease. 
AIDS related prime-age adult mortality has seen life expectancy rates decline 
dramatically in the region, and has severely weakened family support systems already 
stretched thin by extreme chronic poverty. In this context, CTs are increasingly being 
called for as an AIDS mitigation measure, to help families cope with increasing 
dependency ratios and the associated burden of care, and to protect the health and human 
capital development of orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC).  
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In ESA the largest cash transfer program for children is South Africa’s national 
child support grant (CSG) which reaches over 9 million children up to age 14 and which 
is being  expanded to cover children up to age 18 over the next 4 years. However several 
countries have smaller programs, either demonstrations (e.g. Kenya, Malawi, Zambia), or 
established programs but with low coverage (e.g. Mozambique). Lesotho is currently 
designing a CT targeted to OVC, while Botswana and Namibia both have either in-kind 
or cash assistance programs for families that care for orphans. Several other countries are 
currently considering implementing CTs on a trial basis including Rwanda, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. These types of programs are thus very much part of the social policy dialogue in 
ESA, and in March 2006 13 countries in the region, under the auspices of the African 
Union, signed the Livingstone (Zambia) Call for Action, which essentially pledged 
countries to develop national social protection strategies, and to specifically design and 
implement social cash transfers within the next 3 years. A follow-up to the original 
Livingstone Meeting, known as Livingstone 2 and involving the entire continent, is 
currently underway with national and regional meetings on social protection, and an 
African Union Ministerial Meeting planned for October 2008 which will bring together 
African Ministers of Social Development to discuss and adopt a framework for Social 
Development, including Social Protection, for the continent.  
As momentum gathers around CTs, a host of technical questions arise on program 
design parameters such as targeting, transfer levels, and overall costs and affordability. 
An important policy question from the OVC angle is how to scale-up such programs to 
reach children most in need of assistance. A recent study (Schubert 2007)  analyzed the 
demographic composition of participant households under the Zambia and Malawi pilots, 
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which are confined to a single district within each country, and concluded that these two 
programs reach a significant number of AIDS affected households, including OVC, 
though such households are not explicitly targeted. On the other hand, the CT 
demonstration in Kenya targets OVC households directly, while in Mozambique the CT 
program targets the elderly and anyone who is disabled or chronically sick living in a 
poor household; all these programs are thought to capture a significant number of AIDS 
affected households, including OVC, but none of these programs operate at scale. Both 
for these countries and others in design phase such as Lesotho, Rwanda and Uganda, the 
policy question of interest is to determine which of these alternative targeting schemes 
would capture the most vulnerable children if taken to scale.  
This paper simulates the coverage and related impact on poverty and schooling of 
OVC of national cash transfer schemes in four ESA countries, using nationally 
representative household budget and expenditure surveys. We compare the efficiency of 
alternative CT targeting strategies in terms of coverage amongst the poorest deciles; 
assess the poverty impacts of alternative targeting schemes; and conduct empirical 
estimation of the effects of the alternative targeting strategies on the school enrollment of 
OVC in eligible households. This paper is methodologically very similar to Kakwani, 
Soares & Son (2006), who also use microsimulations to predict the ‘impact’ of CTs on 
poverty and school enrollment. However our paper differs in several respects to that one. 
First, our focus is on comparing specific targeting schemes which are actually in 
existence in ESA, while Kakwani et al focus on a generic set of programs including 
universal ones; in that sense our results are of greater practical relevance to the current 
debates on program design in the region. Second, given the strong OVC and AIDS 
47 
 
mitigation undercurrent in the CT dialogue, we explicitly consider the performance of 
these specific schemes in reaching orphans and other ultra-poor children, since these 
groups are typically cited as the main target population for such programs. Finally, our 
modeling of school enrollment focuses on the relevant behavioral parameter in the target 
population—the poorest 30 percent of households—which provides a much more 
accurate assessment of the ability of CTs to affect schooling than that reported in 
Kakwani et al. 
Methods 
Nationally representative household expenditure surveys from 4 ESA countries, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia, are employed to compare the efficiency of 
alternative CT targeting strategies. The modeled strategies represent somewhat stylized 
versions of the actual targeting strategies employed in existing demonstration programs 
in the region. Analysis of each strategy in each country yields results relative to the 
baseline assumption of having no program; comparison of the results across strategies 
allows inference to be drawn regarding each strategy’s performance against specific 
policy objectives. The policy objective of interest here is to maximize the benefit from 
CT programs that accrues to OVC, as measured by coverage in the poorest deciles, 
changes in the consumption of households that contain OVC, and school enrolment of 
OVC. For the purposes of this study, orphans are defined in the survey as children who 
do not live with one or both parents, while vulnerable children are those from poorest 
deciles, with the poorer the decile the more vulnerable the child.     
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Identification of recipient households 
The five strategies under analysis target all households in the lower three deciles 
of the national consumption distribution that meet, respectively, the following criteria: 
1. Labor-constrained households, which have no able-bodied members between the 
ages of 15 and 60, inclusive, or have a dependency ratio greater than three.  
2. Households with age-vulnerable or disabled adults. Age-vulnerable households 
have a female member above the age of 55 or a male member above the age of 60, 
or a disabled or chronically ill adult.  
3. Households with children. “Vulnerable children” are defined in this study as the 
poorest children, hence this scheme effectively targets poor households with 
children less than 18 years of age.  
4. Households with orphans. 
5. The poorest households, employed as a benchmark that represents perfect 
targeting for policies with the sole objective of poverty alleviation. 
As mentioned earlier, the first 4 schemes represent stylized versions of existing 
CT programs in the region. Scheme 1 is currently used in Malawi and in one small pilot 
area in Zambia; scheme 2 is used in the Programa Seguranca Alimentar CT in 
Mozambique; scheme 3 is similar to the OVC-CT program in Kenya; scheme 4 is similar 
to the OVC program in Botswana. Essential characteristics of 4 of the 5 schemes are 
presented in Table A1 in the annex. All schemes attempt to focus transfers on the ultra-
poor, usually the poorest 10 or 20 percent of households, through community based 
targeting mechanisms. 
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The typical CT makes transfers to households, not to individuals. In this analysis, 
recipient households are identified by their ranking in terms of per capita consumption 
conditional on eligibility for benefit under each targeting strategy. Transfers are assigned 
first to the poorest households that meet the eligibility criteria, moving up through the 
consumption ranking until all eligible households have been assigned or a presumed 
program budget constraint is met. In this process, household weights are used to 
determine the number of households from the population represented by each household 
in the sample. Our method thus assumes perfect targeting, and limits leakage to 
households within the bottom 3 deciles—we do not allow transfers to otherwise eligible 
households in the 4th quintile or higher even if there is space in the program budget to do 
so. 
Program parameters 
Ideally, CT programs strike a balance between providing sufficient resources to 
pursue a policy objective and avoiding distortion of consumption patterns. In each 
country analysis, the transfer value is set at approximately 30 percent of median 
consumption among households in the lowest quintile of the consumption distribution. 
This is calculated as the product of the weighted median per capita consumption and 
weighted median household size in the lowest quintile of the individual consumption 
distribution. Figure 1, taken from UNICEF-ESARO (2008), shows transfer levels in 
selected CT programs in Latin America and Africa as a percentage of the national 
poverty line. These range from about 30 percent in Colombia down to about 10 percent in 
some of the Africa programs. These latter programs however tend to focus transfers on 
the poorest 10-20 percent of the population whose consumption is less than half of the 
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respective national poverty lines. Hence transfers likely represent around 20-40 percent 
of the average consumption per person in these programs, which explains our use of a 
transfer level set at 30 percent of median consumption of the poorest quintile in each 
country. 
The national budget constraint is set at 0.5 percent of each country’s GDP, an 
amount that is considered to be politically feasible in Africa at this time, and that is often 
used in dialogue with governments as an indicative fiscal envelope for such programs; 
similar large scale programs in Brazil and Mexico also cost around this amount. 
Anticipation of the budget constraint is reflected in the modeled targeting strategies by 
limiting eligibility to households with per capita consumption that falls below the 30th 
percentile of the national consumption distribution, i.e., households in the lowest three 
deciles of per capita consumption. The national budget constraint includes administrative 
costs, which are valued at twenty percent of total transfers in each country.  
Efficiency of alternative targeting strategies 
Upon identification of recipient households, the number of individuals who would 
benefit from a CT program is estimated using household or population weights, as 
appropriate. These results are used to estimate changes in the poverty headcount ratio 
(H), poverty gap ratio (PG), and squared poverty gap ratio (SPG) that would result from a 
specific targeting strategy. These measures are calculated by the following formulas. The 
headcount poverty ratio measures the proportion of the population living below the 
poverty line: 
∑
∑=
i
h
H i  
 
(1) 
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where i represents individuals in the population and h is an indicator that the individual’s 
per capita consumption is below the poverty line. Summations for all three measures are 
over i, or across the population represented by the household sample. In practice, these 
measures are derived using population weights calculated as the product of household 
size and sample household weight. The poverty gap ratio, which measures the 
proportional difference between per capita consumption and the poverty line for those in 
poverty, is calculated by: 
 
( )∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
povline
pcpovlinehPG ii *  
 
where povline is the poverty line in each country and pc is per capita consumption for the 
individual i. Finally, the squared poverty gap ratio is: 
 
( ) 2
*∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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which places greater emphasis on the welfare of individuals in the poorest households, by 
adding emphasis in the calculation to larger gaps in the difference between their per 
capita consumption and the poverty line. A decrease in any of the three measures 
represents an improvement in poverty.   
Because it is assumed that the poorest households that meet eligibility criteria are 
the first to enter under each targeting strategy, the efficiency of alternative targeting 
strategies is also assessed by profiling the recipient population in terms of numbers of 
(2) 
(3) 
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households, individuals and OVC, and where they fall within the national consumption 
distribution. Of particular interest in this analysis is the extent to which OVC receive 
transfers under targeting strategies that do not explicitly target OVC, as in strategies that 
target labor-constrained households, households with age-vulnerable or disabled adults, 
or households based solely on poverty criteria. The extent of benefit to OVC is measured 
by the total number of participating OVC; the highest consumption decile of participating 
OVC; and the proportion of OVC recipients by consumption decile. Targeting strategies 
that reach higher numbers of OVC and that demonstrate efficiency by reaching OVC in 
the poorest households are preferred under a policy objective of maximizing benefit to 
OVC. 
Consumption and schooling 
The relationship between enrollment and consumption is estimated for children 
aged 6-17 years using a reduced-form model that reflects the results of household 
decisions regarding investment in children’s education (Deaton 1997). Intrahousehold 
resource allocation decisions are not modeled explicitly. The study employs a probit 
specification of the following model using both child-level and household characteristics: 
 
[ ] ihihi pcenroll ελκγχβα ++++= )ln(0 , 
 
where enroll is a dichotomous indicator of enrollment status; ln(pch) is the log of per 
capita consumption; χi is a vector of child-specific characteristics with coefficients γ; and 
κh is a vector of household characteristics with coefficients λ. The included individual 
characteristics are age, sex, and orphan status. The included household characteristics are 
(4) 
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education of the household head, the log of household size, whether the household exists 
in an urban or rural location, and time required to travel to school.3 
This estimation strategy does not support causal analysis, but rather provides 
estimates of the association between consumption and enrollment, and between orphan 
status and enrollment.4 In a full behavioral model of the household economy, schooling, 
leisure and consumption are jointly chosen, and so would be modeled separately. 
Unobserved preferences and abilities would also determine all these outcomes, requiring 
more advanced econometric techniques such as instrumental variables or household fixed 
effects to control for such heterogeneity. The analysis undertaken here is in the spirit of 
the conditional demand literature in that schooling is estimated conditional on a given 
level of household consumption. Changes in the level of consumption are then simulated 
through the various CT schemes, and new schooling rates are predicted. These 
predictions will be over-estimates of the ‘true’ impact of the transfer on schooling if there 
is positive correlation between total expenditures or income and tastes for schooling 
(through for example unobserved ability to generate income).  Note that the estimation 
sample is limited to children who live in households in the lowest three deciles of per 
capita consumption. This sample restriction promotes an estimate of the association 
between consumption and enrollment that reflects consumption patterns among the 
general target group for CT programs modeled in this analysis, which may be different 
than consumption patterns across the population. In particular, consumption is more 
                                                            
3 Travel time is not measured similarly cross survey instruments, and in the case of Uganda, distance in 
kilometers is reported rather than travel time. In all cases the cluster mean value of either distance or travel 
time is used in the analysis. 
 
4 Interactions between consumption and orphan status were explored, but were found not to be jointly 
significant. 
54 
 
likely to be a binding constraint on enrollment decisions for poorer households than for 
wealthier households. Using the full sample would likely attenuate the estimated 
relationship and result in underestimation of the impact of CTs on enrollment among 
beneficiaries. 
Cash transfers and schooling 
The impact of alternative targeting strategies is estimated by comparing the 
predicted probability of enrollment among children in participating households with and 
without the cash transfer. Participating households under each targeting strategy are 
identified as previously described, i.e., by their ranking on per capita consumption 
conditional on eligibility under each set of targeting criteria. Participating children are 
those children observed in the estimation sample who are members of participating 
households. CT impact is projected only for recipient children thus identified, which 
varies by targeting strategy. 
Under each targeting strategy, baseline estimates of the probability of enrollment 
are predicted using observed per capita consumption data and the results obtained by 
estimation of equation (4):  
 
[ ] [ ]( )λκγχβα )))) hihi pcenroll +++Φ== )ln(1Pr 0  
 
where the theoretical coefficients in (4) are replaced by the corresponding estimates 
obtained from probit estimation and the probability of enrollment is estimated using the 
probit operator Φ. The predicted probability of enrollment with the cash transfer also is 
estimated from equation (5), replacing the term pch with pch' = pch+T/hhsize. The latter 
(5) 
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expression represents the new value of per capita consumption after a transfer of value T 
to a household with hhsize members. Differences in the population-weighted means of 
estimated enrollment probabilities among recipient children at baseline and with a cash 
transfer are then compared across alternative targeting strategies.  
These analyses employ certain assumptions that are important for interpretation of 
the results. First is the assumption of perfect targeting within each stated targeting 
strategy. This assumption yields best-case estimates of the schooling impact of alternative 
CT designs, but may not reflect results obtained in practice. A second key assumption is 
that households maintain constant consumption patterns upon receipt of a cash transfer, 
including the allocation of household resources to individual members. This requires not 
that intrahousehold allocation of resources is equivalent across all children, e.g. orphans 
and non-orphans in the same household, but that relative allocations are maintained after 
receipt of a transfer. A third assumption requires also that participating households in the 
simulation of enrollment impacts, equation (5), are homogeneous in their propensity to 
consume additional income. While the assumption of uniform propensity to consume 
may seem unreasonable across a general population, recall that CT programs target the 
poorest households in a consumption distribution that already can be characterized as 
poor on average. Hence, it is plausible to assume that the participating households’ 
propensity to consume is unity, i.e., that small increments of additional income will be 
consumed in full. To the extent this is true, the assumption of uniform propensity to 
consume across households will be met. 
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Data and summary statistics 
Data 
Household income and expenditure surveys from Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda 
and Zambia are used for empirical analysis of the association between consumption and 
schooling, and estimation of the poverty and schooling impacts of cash transfers. 
Specifically, they are the Second Integrated Household Survey (IHS) from Malawi 
(2004); the Inquerito aos Agregados Familiares 2002-03 (IAF) from Mozambique; the 
Uganda National Household Survey (2005-06) and the Living Conditions Monitoring 
Survey IV (LCMS) from Zambia (2004). These surveys are similar in structure; they are 
cross-sectional in nature and support nationally representative analysis.  
The policy variable of interest in these analyses is per capita consumption, 
calculated as the household’s aggregate consumption divided by household size. 
Although receipt of a cash transfer represents an increase in income, use of the 
consumption variable helps to avoid problems associated with underreporting of income 
and measurement of household production. The household consumption aggregates 
employed are those calculated by the national statistics offices that manage the surveys. 
Consumption aggregates are adjusted for local prices, so that the purchasing power of 
equal consumption levels is equivalent across sample clusters. Per capita consumption is 
used to rank eligible households for identification of participation under alternative CT 
targeting schemes and as an independent variable in the enrollment analyses.  
Individual characteristics – age, sex, disability, and enrollment status for children 
– are identified from the household roster when the roster contained these variables, or 
from the health and education sections of the household questionnaires. In the enrollment 
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analysis, age is specified by two splines for ages 6-13 and 14-17. A household is 
considered to host an adult with a disability if any person aged 18 or above was reported 
as having any disability. Children are identified as being enrolled if they are reported as 
currently attending school. 
Household characteristics included in the enrollment analysis are education of the 
household head, the log of household size, whether the household exists in an urban or 
rural location, and time required for travel to school, except in Uganda where distance in 
kilometers is available only. The household head’s education is specified as a construct 
with three categories: whether the person has no formal education or some primary 
education; has completed primary education; or has completed secondary education. The 
cost of travel to school is imputed as a cluster-level mean of travel time, specified as a 
continuous variable when possible, or as a categorical variable using the modal response.  
Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the data supporting the poverty and schooling analyses 
are presented in Table 1. Though one cannot compare poverty lines and, hence, poverty 
rates between countries directly, due to differences that may exist in the consumption 
basket used to calculate poverty lines, these data offer some useful comparisons across 
country and may have some predictive value regarding the comparative results of the 
analysis. GDP is much higher in Uganda at USD 10.6 billion than in the other three 
countries. Malawi’s GDP is USD 1.9 billion; Mozambique’s is USD 4.1 billion and 
Zambia’s is USD 5.4 billion. Inflating GDP figures with country-specific consumer price 
indices and using 2007 foreign exchange rates, the resultant CT budgets for each country, 
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set as a percentage (0.5%) of GDP, would be approximately 12.1, 28.8, 39.8, and 53.0 
USD million (2007) for Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Uganda respectively. 
Examination of the baseline poverty indicators supports a general conclusion that 
larger numbers of individuals will be predicted to receive transfers under CT programs in 
Zambia and Uganda than in the other two countries in this study, and that the lowest 
numbers will occur in Malawi. Zambia has the highest poverty headcount ratio (H = 0.70) 
and the highest squared poverty gap ratio (SPG = 0.25): not only does a larger proportion 
of the population live below the poverty line in Zambia, but the gap between per capita 
consumption and the poverty line is greater in Zambia for the poorest households. 
Malawi and Mozambique have similar H and SPG, while all poverty indicators are lowest 
in Uganda and Uganda also has the largest population at 30 million. These basic features 
suggest that Uganda and Zambia will likely have the largest coverage for any given 
program, and Malawi will have the smallest given its small population size and GDP.  
Descriptive statistics for the schooling analysis, presented in the lower panel of 
Table 1, are for the sub-sample of children living in households in the target group 
defined by the lowest three consumption deciles. Of these children, more are of 
secondary school age (14-17) while among primary school age (6-13), more are likely to 
be enrolled in school in Uganda (73 percent and 80 percent) than in the other countries. 
In Zambia, the proportion of children of secondary school age who are enrolled (68%) is 
higher than the proportion of children of primary school age (59%). Mean age and 
household size and gender ratios are similar across countries. One might expect that 
greater increases in school enrollment will be realized in samples with lower baseline 
enrollment rates, but simulations based on empirical analysis do not bear this out; rather, 
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the highest enrollment increases are estimated in Uganda, which has the highest mean 
enrollment rates. 
Other household characteristics of these children – education of the household 
head and household setting – have potential predictive value for the results of the 
schooling simulations. If households headed by individuals with more education have 
stronger preferences for education, one would expect their income-elasticity of schooling 
to be lower. Likewise, if households set in rural areas have higher opportunity costs of 
their children attending school due to travel time and the alternative uses of children’s 
time, e.g. food production, such households would be expected to have a higher income 
elasticity of schooling. The proportion of children living in a household headed by an 
individual with no education or some primary education is highest in Malawi (90%). In 
Zambia, the proportion of children living in a household headed by an individual who has 
completed secondary education is highest (7%). In Mozambique, 69 percent of children 
in the sample live in households headed by someone with no or some primary education, 
while 32 percent of children in the target households live in urban areas. In sum, based on 
the descriptive statistics alone, one might expect a stronger enrollment response to cash 
transfers in Malawi than in Zambia, with the enrollment response in Mozambique falling 
in between. This is consistent with the simulation results discussed below.  
Results 
Total costs 
Table 2 presents results for the total cost of each program if implemented under 
the parameters described earlier. Table 2 demonstrate that a CT program that targets 
labor-constrained households will reach individuals in the third decile of the consumption 
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distribution without exhausting the budget, i.e., under perfect targeting assumptions all 
eligible households in the target group would be reached and program resources would be 
left over. While the program budget constraint would be approached in Malawi (95 
percent) and Mozambique (94 percent), a much lower proportion of the budget would be 
used in Uganda (80 percent) and Zambia (29 percent), indicating that if a government is 
willing to expend the specified budget for CT programs more coverage might be reached 
under alternative targeting schemes, unless the government was willing to distribute 
transfers to households in the 4th decile of per capita consumption.  
Targeting age- and disability-vulnerable households would exhaust the budget in 
Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda but not in Zambia, presumably due to the very 
different demographic profile of the poor in Zambia. The same is the case for an orphan 
targeting strategy—in Zambia targeting orphans in the poorest 3 deciles would only 
expend 55 percent of the program budget (0.5 percent of GDP). On the other hand, CT 
programs that target households with children would both exhaust the budget and reach 
poorer households on average. Recipients under child-centered targeting would both 
exhaust the budget and reach only individuals living in the lowest decile of consumption 
in Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda; in Zambia, a small proportion of individuals in the 
second consumption decile would be reached as well (results not shown).  
In all four countries, the proportional gain in per capita consumption is higher for 
strategies that target children explicitly, as compared to strategies that target labor-
constrained, age- and disability-vulnerable or orphan households. In Malawi the range of 
proportional increase in per capita consumption across targeting strategies is 35-48 
percent, in Mozambique 36-61 percent, in Uganda 34-50 percent and in Zambia 50-75 
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percent. In all cases, the greatest proportional increase in per capita consumption is 
obtained through a strategy that explicitly targets the poorest households, and these 
results are almost identical to a strategy that explicitly targets children. On the other hand, 
explicitly targeting orphans results to the lowest gain in per capita consumption among 
recipients in Uganda and Zambia, while in Malawi the gain among orphan households is 
the same as the gain among labor constraints households. 
Coverage 
Counts of recipients by type, presented in Table 3, demonstrate that strategies 
which explicitly target households with children tend to reach more individuals and more 
children than other targeting strategies. Targeting of labor-constrained households 
reaches the fewest households and the fewest individuals, not surprising since such 
households tend to focus benefits on elderly households. In Malawi, all programs tend to 
reach the same number of households, but a child or strict poverty focused program 
reaches more individuals and children.   
Strategies that target households with age-vulnerable or disabled adults reach 
nearly as many individuals as strategies that target children in Malawi and Mozambique, 
but do not reach children or the ultra-poor with similar efficiency. For example, in 
Mozambique the age-targeted scheme actually reaches more households (148,828) than 
the child targeted one (149,409), but reaches only 637,255 children versus 1,009,127 in 
the latter. 
Most interesting is the scheme that targets poor households with orphans for it 
highlights the dilemma faced by governments in an environment where the social 
protection agenda is driven by vulnerability to HIV and AIDS. Evaluations of pilot CTs 
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have used the proportion of beneficiaries who are OVC or who are orphans as a metric of 
the benefit conferred on these populations of interest, or on AIDS affected households. 
Simulations in this study find that this measure is roughly comparable across targeting 
strategies. In Malawi, children represent 65 percent of recipients under all strategies 
except one that targets age- or disability-households (54%). A similar pattern is in 
Mozambique (54-60 percent), Zambia (42-51 percent) and Uganda (53-71 percent). 
Naturally orphans represent the largest proportion of recipients under the orphan-targeted 
scheme (36, 30 and 36 percent respectively in Malawi, Zambia and Uganda), with the 
labor constraints scheme a distant second. While the orphan strategy reaches the most 
number of orphans, it reaches the fewer children in total relative to the child targeted 
scheme, and reaches fewer people in the poorest consumption decile as well. Because 
orphans are not concentrated in the poorest decile, policy-makers face a trade-off in the 
type of vulnerability to focus on: income vulnerability versus orphanhood. 
From the perspective of a policy objective to reach the most vulnerable children, 
more informative than simple counts of recipients is the proportion of children in 
households in the lowest three consumption deciles that would be reached under 
alternative targeting strategies. Table 4 shows the proportion of children and orphans that 
would be reached in each of the three poorest consumption deciles under alternative 
targeting strategies. These results indicate that a strategy which targets households with 
children is most efficient at reaching children in the poorest households--the highest 
proportion of children in the lower deciles of consumption are reached under such a 
targeting strategy focused on poor households with children. In contrast, an orphan 
strategy reaches all orphans in the lowest decile, but misses many other children in that 
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decile. For example, such a strategy reaches about 28 percent of the poorest children 
(those in the bottom decile) in Malawi, Zambia and Uganda, compared to 39, 100 and 53 
percent respectively under the child focused strategy. In contrast, the child focused 
strategy in Zambia also reaches 100 percent of orphans in the poorest decile because, as 
mentioned earlier, in Zambia there are very few orphans in the poorest decile. In Malawi 
and Uganda however, this scheme reaches 46 and 50 percent of orphans in the lowest 
decile respectively.  
Figures 2-4 further illustrate the policy trade-off faced by governments in Eastern 
& Southern Africa as they seek to protect the most vulnerable children through targeted 
CTs. The last two bars in each cluster show the percent of all children and percent of all 
orphans reached in all 3 of the bottom deciles in contrast to Table 4 which shows the 
percent reached in each decile by itself. In general, more children of any kind are reached 
by either the child or orphan centered scheme in the 3 countries shown (Malawi, Zambia 
and Uganda), particularly children in the poorest consumption decile. In all 3 countries, 
the orphan scheme reaches all orphans in the bottom decile, but fewer children in that 
decile illustrating the potential trade-off in vulnerability targeting. But the trade-off 
becomes less clear when all children in the bottom 3 deciles are considered. In Malawi 
for example, if the bottom 3 deciles are taken together, then the ‘coverage’ of the orphan 
scheme among all children is about the same as the child focused scheme, but the 
coverage of orphans is significantly higher. The same is the case in Uganda: the coverage 
among all children in the bottom 3 deciles is the about the same in either scheme, but the 
coverage of orphans is higher in the orphan focused scheme. 
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It is only when one focuses on the ultra-poorest children, those in the bottom 
decile, that the distinction between the two schemes (child focused versus orphan 
focused) becomes clear. If policy makers give greater weight to this group, and if 
targeting is possible, then the scheme that favors children over orphans will reach the 
same more children in the poorest decile and about the same number of orphans in that 
decile as well, relative to an orphan targeted scheme. 
Poverty analysis 
Estimates of the three poverty indicators – the poverty headcount ratio (H), the 
poverty gap ratio (PG), and the squared poverty gap ratio (SPG) – at baseline and that 
result from simulation of alternative targeting schemes are shown in the upper panel of 
Table 5. The lower panel lists the percentage improvement – decreases in the ratios – 
from baseline associated with each targeting strategy. With assistance to OVC as the 
policy objective, and since vulnerability is identified by the lowest levels of consumption 
(i.e general household income poverty), the SPG is the most pertinent indicator of 
differences between targeting strategies.  
In all countries the largest improvements in SPG are achieved by strategies that 
target households with children or the poorest households. Strategies that target labor-
constrained households have the smallest effect. For example, in Mozambique targeting 
households with children or prioritizing the poorest households is projected to decrease 
the SPG by nearly nine percent, from 0.103 to 0.094; a strategy that targets labor-
constrained households would decrease the SPG by only 5.8 percent. The associated 
results in Malawi are estimated at 8.75 percent and five percent, respectively. Although 
the respective proportional differences in SPG in Zambia are smaller in magnitude when 
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each strategy is compared to baseline (4.9 and 1.2 percent), the magnitude of the 
proportional difference obtained by a strategy that explicitly targets children is four times 
the magnitude of the proportional decrease that would be obtained through a strategy 
focused on household labor constraints. The overall percentage changes in SPG are 
largest in Uganda, but this is purely because of the very low base (0.044) in that country. 
But even in Uganda, the strategy of targeting households with children improves the SPG 
by roughly double and triple compared to the strategy that targets age vulnerability or 
labor-constraints respectively. 
 The performance of a strategy of explicitly targeting orphans varies across 
countries, though it is never better (in terms of the SPG) than targeting children in 
general. In Zambia, targeting orphans actually performs worse than targeting age 
vulnerability in terms of improvements in both the PG and SPG. This further illustrates 
the targeting dilemma in Eastern & Southern Africa. An orphan driven social protection 
intervention that distributes cash to households with orphans will not reach the poorest 
households. 
Since the general target group for CTs simulated in this analysis is limited to 
households within the lowest three consumption deciles and the poverty rate in all 
countries except Uganda is well above 30 percent, one would expect the poverty 
headcount ratio not to be affected by implementation of a CT in these three countries. In 
Malawi and Mozambique, however, the poverty headcount ratio does decrease with 
strategies that target labor-constrained households, if only by 0.2 percent. The economic 
profile of beneficiaries shown in Table 2 suggests that in these two countries these 
targeting strategies confer benefits on households that enable them to rise above the 
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poverty line at the margin even though the target group is limited to the lowest three 
deciles of the consumption distribution. Several factors appear to be at work.  
The program budget is not exhausted by programs that target labor-constrained 
households, so all eligible households within the target group under that strategy obtain 
transfers (i.e. all households in the bottom three deciles). The difference between the 
baseline H in Zambia (70%) and the cut-off for eligibility (30%) is substantially higher 
than in Malawi and Mozambique; this contributes to the differences in SPG between 
Malawi and Mozambique, on the one hand, and Zambia on the other. The relatively low 
baseline SPG in Malawi and Mozambique suggests that eligible households in the target 
group in these countries are much nearer the poverty line relative to those in Zambia; the 
relatively low baseline SPG in Uganda is due to that country’s much lower overall 
poverty rate. In summary, the size of the transfer though small is sufficient to push 
certain households in the third consumption decile above the poverty line under certain 
targeting schemes  in Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda, but not in Zambia. 
Schooling analysis 
The association between school enrollment and household per capita consumption 
was estimated using a reduced form probit regression and samples of children aged 6-17 
who live in households in the lowest three deciles of the consumption distribution. These 
results are presented in Table 6. The results indicate the estimation models perform 
generally as expected, with some exceptions. Coefficient estimates on the log of per 
capita consumption are statistically significant for Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda but 
not Zambia; the magnitude of the estimates range from 0.67 (Uganda) to 0.17 for 
Mozambique.  
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In all study countries, the probability of enrollment increases with age among 
primary-school aged children, likely due to delays in starting school. In contrast, the 
probability of enrollment decreases with age among secondary-school aged children, 
possibly due to increased probabilities of dropping out as perceived returns to education 
may decrease with grade and the opportunity costs of school attendance increase with 
age, as well as structural constraints such as the fewer places in secondary schools. 
Estimates on distance-to-school variables, not reported in Table 6, were negative in all 
models, but statistically significant for Mozambique and Uganda. A gender gap for 
education is observed only in Mozambique, where girls are less likely to be enrolled in 
school than boys. Maternal orphans are less likely to be enrolled in Malawi; paternal 
orphans in Zambia. Orphan status could not be determined for the Mozambique sample. 
Children in households headed by individuals with more education are more likely to be 
enrolled in school than those living in households in which heads have not completed 
primary school. Household size tends to be positively associated with the probability of 
enrollment, perhaps because larger households offer greater availability of substitutes for 
the child’s input to household production. Children in urban households are more likely 
to be enrolled in school, perhaps again because the opportunity cost of children’s school 
attendance to other household production is lower in urban areas than in rural.  
Simulations of the impact of CTs on school enrollment are presented in Table 7. 
Within country, variation in the estimated increase in enrollment is due to differences in 
targeting strategies. Simulations were conducted using sub-samples defined by children 
in recipient households. Based on samples from Malawi, the expected increase in school 
enrollment is 3.5 to 5 percentage points for all children aged 6-17, depending on the 
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targeting strategy. The estimated increase is higher among secondary-school aged 
children (3.8-5.3 percentage points) than for primary-school aged children (3.4-4.9). For 
Mozambique, the expected increase is lower by half, indicating an increase of 1.5-2.6 
percentage points in enrollment among all children, 1.6-2.6 among primary-school aged 
children, and 1.5-2.6 among secondary-school aged children. The estimated impacts are 
largest in Uganda, where they range from 3.9 to 6.1 percentage points in primary and 3.4 
to 5.8 points in secondary. These simulated results compare favorably to impact estimates 
on enrollment in conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico (7 point increase at 
secondary level) and Bangladesh (8 point increase at primary level), as well as the 
unconditional South African Child Support Grant scheme (7 points) (EPRI, 2008). 
In all countries, comparison of the estimated impact across targeting strategies 
indicates that targeting households with children or the poorest households produces 
greater impact on school enrollment than other targeting strategies. Targeting the poorest 
households regardless of household structure yields the highest increases among the 
recipient population; targeting households with children is a close second-best. In 
Mozambique and Uganda either of these two targeting strategies is estimated to produce 
increases in enrollment approximately one-third greater than strategies that target labor-
constrained or age- or disability-vulnerable households. In Malawi, targeting households 
with children or the poorest households would yield enrollment increases about one-fifth 
greater than a strategy that targets labor-constrained households and over a fourth greater 
than a strategy targeting age- or disability-vulnerable households. This of course is 
because the labor-constrained targeting scheme reaches fewer children than the other 
ones.   
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What is noteworthy in Table 7 is that the orphan targeted scheme yields lower 
improvements in school enrollment compared to either the child focused or pure poverty 
focused scheme. This is for two reasons. First, the pure poverty focused scheme captures 
more of the poorest children due to the demographic composition of the ultra-poor, and it 
is precisely among this group that economic constraints are most binding. The flip side to 
this is that the orphan scheme reaches more orphans but in relatively better off 
households, where actual school attendance rates are higher, leading a lower potential for 
impact.   
Conclusions and policy implications 
This analysis investigates the extent to which different targeting schemes 
currently under trial in ESA would reach OVC if they went to scale. The pilot studies in 
question employ different targeting strategies. Programs in Malawi and Zambia target 
labor-constrained households. In Mozambique, the CT targets age- or disability-
vulnerable households. A third strategy places special emphasis on the presence of 
children in the household, similar to the pilot program in Kenya though Kenyan data 
were unavailable for the analysis and a fourth strategy in place in Botswana is to target 
families with orphans. Finally, a strategy that targets households based purely on 
consumption rankings was included for comparison. All of these programs include an 
aim to provide resources to the “poorest of the poor” except for Botswana where the 
program is not poverty targeted.  Small scale research on several pilots have evaluated 
well and some of these evaluations document that a substantial proportion of recipients 
are AIDS affected. The primary question is whether this would be true in the national 
context, or whether evaluation results are a function of the selection of the location for 
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the pilot programs; there may also be demographic differences across countries which 
imply that results from one area cannot be generalized to another. 
This paper finds that the proportion of recipients who are orphans is fairly 
consistent across targeting strategies that do not explicitly target orphans, though a 
strategy that targets age- or disability-vulnerable households is slightly less effective in 
this regard. Orphan targeted schemes implemented according to the parameters set out in 
this paper would have about a third of all recipients (i.e all recipient household members) 
as orphans.  
However a key question that arises in this analysis is whether the proportion of 
recipients who are orphans is a sufficient metric to assess the efficiency with which any 
particular targeting strategy reaches orphans. The results suggest that this is not the case: 
substantial variation exists across targeting strategies in the economic profiles, counts and 
the proportion of ultra-poor orphans that are reached by CTs, as well as the projected 
impact on enrollment rates among program participants. The economic profile of 
recipient households indicates that targeting households with children in the poorest 
households concentrates resources in the lowest consumption deciles, while the benefits 
of other strategies are more diffuse, reaching households in higher consumption deciles 
and not always making full use of the available budget. On the other hand, an orphan 
focused strategy reaches the most number of orphans, but includes households into the 
third consumption decile while excluding many of the poorest children. This highlights 
the key dilemma faced by policy makers in a context where social protection is driven by 
the HIV and AIDS mitigation agenda. There is a trade-off between pure poverty 
targeting, or targeting poor households with children, and targeting households with 
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orphans. This trade-off is particularly important when we focus on the ultra-poorest 
households, those in the bottom consumption decile.    
From the perspective of AIDS mitigation and vulnerability due to extreme 
poverty, the most relevant indicator of targeting efficiency may be the coverage of 
orphans and children in the lowest consumption decile; on this score the most efficient 
scheme is one that targets poor households with children. In all countries, such a scheme 
reaches the most number of children in the poorest decile and covers about 50 percent of 
orphans in the poorest deciles. The win-win of targeting poor households with children is 
best exemplified in Zambia, where the proposed strategy of targeting poor households 
with children reaches 100 percent of all children and 100 percent of orphans in the 
bottom consumption decile.  
Results of the enrollment simulations clearly show that targeting households with 
children or the poorest households achieve higher increases in enrollment in all of the 
study countries than strategies that target labor-constrained or age- or disability-
vulnerable or orphan households. That the highest proportional increases in school 
enrollment are projected under a poverty-based targeting strategy is consistent with the 
notion that household budgets are binding constraints on children’s enrollment; also at 
work here is the fact that the poorest households nearly always contain school-aged 
children.  
There is substantial variation in the projected enrollment effects of CTs, from 
roughly six percentage points in Uganda to less than one in Zambia.  Since the only 
variable that changes in the simulations is consumption, these differences are due to 
differences in the income-elasticity of demand for education across countries. Heads of 
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households in the Zambian sample exhibit higher education on average than in the 
Ugandan sample. If individuals with more education value education more highly then it 
is reasonable to assume that their income-elasticity of demand for education is lower, 
thus yielding a lower response to increases in income. Income-elasticity of demand for 
education may also be higher when the cost of education is higher. It is telling however 
that despite universal free primary schooling in countries like Malawi and Uganda, 
income constraints due to either out-of-pocket or opportunity costs still remain a barrier 
to access, highlighting the need for complementary demand side interventions such as 
CTs to enable the remaining 20 percent of children to attend school.  
In summary, explicit targeting of households with children is projected to reach 
higher proportions of children in the lowest consumption deciles, which implies greater 
targeting efficiency under a set of policy objectives that places emphasize on the welfare 
of vulnerable children where vulnerability is assumed to be strongly correlated with 
extreme poverty. Such a strategy also would reach larger numbers of orphans, yield 
higher proportional increases in per capita consumption, and produce larger increases in 
school enrollment than strategies that target labor-constrained, age- or disability-
vulnerable or orphan households. A strategy that targets the poorest households 
regardless of household structure performs slightly better in terms of increases in per 
capita consumption and enrollment, but does not reach as many OVC as targeting 
households with children.  
The main policy implication of this work is that, while the numbers of 
participating children may be reasonably comparable between certain targeting strategies, 
the distribution of benefits under a child-centered targeting strategy clearly favors the 
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poorest of the poor and also reaches the poorest orphans. To the extent that vulnerability 
is directly correlated with extreme poverty, CTs that target ultra poor households with 
children will have the greatest impact on OVC in the region. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics, by country, for poverty and schooling analyses.  
 
  Malawi Mozambique Zambia Uganda 
Poverty analysis     
Population (million) 12.2 18.3 10.8 30 
GDP (USD billion) 1.90 4.09 5.44 10.6 
Poverty line, monthly (USD) 9.71 10.07 26.13 13.8 
Per capita consumption, monthly (USD) 15.04 14.94 32.88 23.57 
Baseline poverty indicators     
Poverty headcount ratio 0.524 0.541 0.701 0.351 
Poverty gap ratio 0.178 0.205 0.376 0.105 
Squared poverty gap ratio 0.080 0.103 0.245 0.044 
Household size (mean) 4.5 4.8 5.2 5.3 
Households in sample 11,280 8,700 19,236 7,421 
Schooling analysis (children aged 6-17 in 
bottom 3 deciles)     
Percent enrolled     
Age 6-13 79.4 62.3 59.2 79.8 
Age 14-17 68.7 56.6 68.0 72.9 
Age 10.7 10.8 11.1 10.9 
Female (percent) 50.2 48.1 48.9 48.9 
Household size 7.1 7.1 7.8 7.7 
Household head's education (percent)     
None or some primary 90.1 68.6 71.5 75.6 
Completed primary 8.9 17.3 21.4 19.3 
Completed secondary 0.6 6.1 7.1 5.1 
Percent urban 4.5 31.6 17.3 6.1 
Observations 5,830 4,734 11,908 4,649 
Notes: Gross domestic product values obtained from the IMF (2007). Summary statistics for the poverty 
analysis are computed using population weights that were derived from household weights and 
household size. Summary statistics for the schooling analysis are computed as weighted means for 
children aged 6-17 years. Monetary data are given in USD 2007. Time required to travel to school is 
omitted from this table due to differences in the specification of this variable -- continuous or categorical -- 
across individual surveys.  
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Table 3.2: Economic profile of recipients and budget requirements 
 
 
Highest 
Decile 
Reached 
Mean increase in 
per capita 
consumption 
among recipients 
(%) 
Total Cost 
(USD) 
Total Cost as 
Percent of 
Budget 
Malawi (budget: $12.1 
million) 
    
labor-constrained HHs 3 41.2 11,524,837 95 
HHs w/elderly or disabled 2 34.9 12,084,516 100 
HHs w/children 1 47.7 12,071,317 100 
HHs with orphans 2 40.1 12,084,535 100 
poorest households 1 48.0 12,072,154 100 
     
Mozambique (budget: $28.8 million)    
labor-constrained HHs 3 35.7 27,110,732 94 
HHs w/elderly or disabled 2 43.6 28,780,488 100 
HHs w/children 1 58.8 28,699,892 100 
HHs with orphans     
poorest households 1 60.9 28,788,674 100 
     
Zambia (budget: $39.8 
million)     
labor-constrained HHs 3 50.0 11,497,877 29 
HHs w/elderly or disabled 3 45.7 29,259,454 73 
HHs w/children 2 66.4 39,806,512 100 
HHs with orphans 3 41.1 22,042,706 55 
poorest households 2 74.7 39,836,816 100 
     
Uganda (budget $52.8 
million)     
labor-constrained HHs 3 38.4 42,038,392 80 
HHs w/elderly or disabled 3 38.6 52,887,784 100 
HHs w/children 1 48.3 52,779,932 100 
HHs with orphans 2 33.8 52,834,124 100 
poorest households 1 50.4 52,751,096 100 
Notes: Results presented are from analysis of the full household sample, using population weights. 
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Table 3.4: Percentage of all children and orphans who are reached under 
alternative CT targeting criteria, by household consumption decile 
   Children   Orphans   
Wealth Decile Lowest Second Third Lowest Second Third
Malawi       
labor-constrained HHs 10.1 9.0 8.1 20.2 19.2 13.9
HHs w/elderly | disabled 17.1 12.7 0.0 19.0 15.3 0.0
HHs w/children 37.9 0.0 0.0 45.3 0.0 0.0
HHs w/orphans       
poorest households 37.6 0.0 0.0 45.0 0.0 0.0
Mozambique       
labor-constrained HHs 20.4 13.9 12.5    
HHs w/elderly | disabled 31.3 17.6 0.0    
HHs w/children 55.6 0.0 0.0    
poorest households 53.8 0.0 0.0    
Zambia       
labor-constrained HHs 12.3 11.7 10.4 19.1 18.1 15.9
HHs w/elderly | disabled 31.7 28.5 23.9 49.1 47.9 42.3
HHs w/children 100.0 36.0 0.0 100.0 38.5 0.0
poorest households 100.0 21.4 0.0 100.0 19.8 0.0
Uganda       
labor-constrained HHs 14.5 10.6 13.1 25.3 19.7 22.9
HHs w/elderly | disabled 17.5 19.4 1.9 24.4 30.2 1.7
HHs w/children 53.2 0.0 0.0 54.4 0.0 0.0
poorest households 50.9 0.0 0.0 51.7 0.0 0.0
Notes: Numbers of recipients and totals in target group are calculated from the full 
household sample, using population weights. Orphans cannot be identified from the 
Mozambique IAF. 
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Table 3.6: Coefficient and standard error estimates from probit models of school enrollment 
for children aged 6-17 in households in the lowest three deciles of the consumption 
distribution, by country 
 
  Malawi Mozambique Zambia Uganda 
Log(per capita consumption) 0.417 0.168 0.037 0.569 
 (0.105) (0.075) (0.027) (0.148) 
Age 6-14, spline 0.133 0.131 0.213 0.135 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) 
Age 15-17, spline -0.34 -0.29 -0.231 -0.48 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.036) 
Female 0.017 -0.134 0.024 -0.018 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.025) (0.045) 
Maternal orphan -0.227  0.08 -0.034 
 (0.101)  (0.102) (0.134) 
Paternal orphan 0.006  0.174 -0.107 
 (0.068)  (0.053) (0.084) 
Double orphan -0.055  -0.043 -2.901 
 (0.093)  (0.087) (0.177) 
HH head completed primary 0.548 0.247 0.186 0.168 
 (0.092) (0.069) (0.044) (0.075) 
HH head completed secondary 1.052 0.208 0.45 0.298 
 (0.499) (0.108) (0.066) (0.127) 
Log(household size) 0.291 0.085 0.364 0.2 
 (0.090) (0.069) (0.050) (0.076) 
urban 0.336 0.129 0.14 0.003 
 (0.146) (0.090) (0.049) (0.088) 
Observations 5,804 4,734 10,391 4,542 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates in bold are statistically significant at 0.05. Robust standard error 
estimates are presented in parentheses. Estimates on time to travel to school (available from 
author) are omitted from the table.   
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Figure 3.1: Value of transfers in selected cash transfer programs 
 
Figure 1: Value of transfers in selected cash transfer 
programs
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Figure 3.2: Percent of children and orphaned reached in Malawi 
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Figure 3.3: Percent of children and orphaned reached in Zambia 
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Figure 3.4: Percent of children and orphaned reached in Uganda 
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Figure 3.5: Poverty impacts of alternative targeting schemes in Malawi 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Poverty impacts of alternative targeting schemes in Zambia 
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Figure 3.7: Poverty impacts of alternative targeting schemes in Uganda 
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CHAPTER IV: COMPARING THE POVERTY EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL CASH 
GRANTS FOR CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY: SIMULATION ANALYSES 
FROM FOUR COUNTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
 
Introduction 
Universal cash grants are a form of social cash transfers (CTs) that provide small 
predictable sums of money to households that include vulnerable individuals such as 
children or the elderly. These CTs represent a relatively new social protection instrument 
in Eastern and Southern Africa. As opposed to targeted CTs, which tend to focus 
resources on poor households with residents exposed to particular vulnerabilities, 
universal cash grants extend benefits to all households that include vulnerable individuals 
regardless of income. South Africa has had a universal old-age pension (OAP) and child 
support grant (CSG) for over a decade, and OAPs exist in Lesotho, Botswana and 
Namibia. Targeted CTs to vulnerable groups exist in a number of countries including 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Namibia, and Rwanda, and smaller scale government programs 
exist, or are getting under way, in Kenya, Malawi, Ghana, Lesotho and Zambia. Several 
other countries are currently considering implementing CTs on a trial basis including 
Tanzania, Angola and Uganda. 
As universal cash grants and CTs more generally gain traction in Africa, there is 
considerable debate regarding appropriate targeting strategies, particularly with regard to 
the benefits that accrue to orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC). CSGs are 
advocated to provide immediate benefits for children by directly targeting households 
with children. Proponents of OAPs advocate that OAPs confer benefits on children 
including OVC directly through their residence in beneficiary households, and indirectly 
through the fertility effects of ensuring old-age security. While the ideal may a 
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combination of CSG and OAP, budget constraints may require progressive 
implementation of these alternatives, begging the question of which group to target first.   
This analysis seeks to inform the current debate by providing comparative 
projections of the poverty effects of CSGs and OAPs in four countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. It uses data from nationally representative household consumption surveys to 
conduct microsimulations of the poverty effects of six alternative targeting strategies for 
universal cash grants. Cash grants are new to the region and panel data exist only from 
small area interventions. Small area analysis may misinform decisions regarding national 
scale-up if there is significant variation within country. Thus, microsimulation can 
provide useful information to policy makers in resource-poor environments in advance of 
difficult and competing policy choices.  
Background 
The case for CTs in East and Southern Africa has been made from three 
perspectives: the HIV and AIDS policy dialog; the fostering of economic development 
via the building of human capital and household productive investment; and a human-
rights based approach. In the HIV and AIDS policy dialogue, the ‘protective’ dimension 
of programming increasingly calls for the use of social cash transfers to support families 
that care for orphans and other children affected by AIDS (UNICEF & UNAIDS 2004; 
Adato & Bassett 2007). Advocacy for such programs is driven by the fact that AIDS is 
the number one cause of prime-age mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, and the region hosts 
approximately 25-30 million orphans, one third of whom have lost a parent to the disease. 
AIDS related prime-age adult mortality has led life expectancy rates to decline 
dramatically in the region and has severely weakened family support systems already 
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stretched thin by extreme chronic poverty. In this context, CTs are increasingly being 
called for as an AIDS mitigation measure, to help families cope with increasing 
dependency ratios and the associated burden of care, and to protect the health and human 
capital development of orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC).  
Social cash transfers, targeted or universal, conditional and unconditional, have 
rapidly gained popularity in developing countries as a way to mitigate current poverty 
and food insecurity and to break the inter-generational cycle of poverty by allowing 
families to invest in the human capital of their children. This approach to social 
protection in developing countries began in the 1990s when three influential countries, 
Brazil, Mexico and South Africa began distributing cash to poor families. The Mexican 
program, a conditional cash transfer (CCT), had a particularly large effect on global anti-
poverty policy primarily because of the results of a large-scale social experiment which 
demonstrated significant positive impacts on beneficiaries across a range of outcomes 
including health and nutrition (Gertler 2004), food security (Hoddinott & Skoufias 2005) 
and schooling (Schultz 2004). Based on these results, the World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank began advocating aggressively for CCTs in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and other middle-income countries. Since 2000 CCTs have been 
developed in Colombia (Famílias en Acción), Costa Rica (Superémonos), Jamaica 
(Poverty Alleviation through Health and Education), Paraguay (Tekopora) and Turkey 
(Social Solidarity Fund), among others. 
The evidence on CCTs demonstrates that beyond reducing poverty and helping 
vulnerable families cope with adversity, CTs support the construction of human capital of 
today’s children, particularly via improved health status and educational obtainment, 
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which will lead to improved earnings in the future. CTs facilitate both improved access 
and improved utilization of health and educational services. Moreover, CTs also have 
significant impacts on economic development, both at the household level in terms of 
investment in productive activities, but also in terms of multiplier effects on the local 
economy. 
The existing evidence on the impact of unconditional transfers on children's 
welfare is more sparse and mixed, and there is no experimental evidence to date. Aruejo, 
Carter & Woolard (2007) report significant impacts of the CSG on child height using a 
sample of children from KwaZulu Natal. Heinrich, Samson & Regalia (2008) show 
significant increases in school enrolment due to the CSG using a robust non-experimental 
method. Duflo (2003), however, shows that unconditional pension transfers to elderly 
women in South Africa have a bigger impact on girls' nutritional status than similar 
transfers given to men. Hence, unconditional CTs have the potential to promote 
children’s human capital development (see also Stewart & Handa forthcoming) and tend 
to be the model followed in African countries where household income constraints are 
more binding and for reasons of social protection. 
A final argument for CTs lies in the notion that social protection ought to be part 
of the basic package of services, or social minimum, that governments are obliged to 
provide to their citizens to ensure a minimum acceptable standard of living. The ‘rights-
based approach’ to social protection points out that access to social protection is 
explicitly mentioned in the international covenants that African countries are state parties 
to, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Universal 
  90 
 
grants of the kind envisioned in these covenants, primarily old age pensions, currently 
exist in the relatively well-off countries in Southern Africa, including South Africa, 
Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia, and form part of the policy discussion in many other 
countries of the region.  
As momentum gathers around CTs, technical questions arise regarding program 
design parameters such as targeting, transfer levels, and overall costs and affordability. 
From a rights-based perspective and given limited budgets, two obviously vulnerable but 
distinct groups have dominated the policy dialogue: the elderly and children. Targeted 
CTs often have focused on child vulnerability and orphan hood in particular, directing 
resources to households that are thought to contain vulnerable children, e.g. in Kenya, 
Malawi, and Namibia. Universal social grants on the other hand have tended to focus on 
the elderly with the sole exception of South Africa, which provides universal grants to 
both groups. The human rights approach to programming acknowledges that rights may 
be realized progressively, and advocates that such progressive realization begin with the 
most marginalized. Thus, a key decision faced by policy makers in the face of limited 
budgets and competing interests is which of these two vulnerable groups to target first.  
The debate regarding appropriate targeting strategies, particularly the extent to 
which benefits accrue to OVC, is largely a conceptual one in which the evidence brought 
to bear is both limited and mixed. Kidd (2009) argues that OAPs yield benefits for 
children by ensuring old-age security, which can result in greater investment of parents’ 
prime-age earnings in their children’s human capital development and, in the long-term 
reduce fertility as OAPs substitute for parents’ dependence on their children’s support in 
old age. Others have argued that a large share of the responsibility for OVC care is borne 
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by the elderly, and particularly that OVC frequently live in households that comprise the 
elderly and children without prime-aged adults in the middle generation (HelpAge 
International & the International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2003, HelpAge International 2008). 
However, it is difficult to find these so-called “missing generation” households in 
nationally representative survey datasets (author’s experience); whether this is because 
the evidence cited is based on small-area studies or because such households are missed 
in large-survey sampling frames is unclear. Schubert (2007) cites the result of several 
evaluations to demonstrate that 50-80 percent of households that benefit from OAPs 
include children. However, Stewart & Handa (forthcoming) show that OAPs may miss a 
significant portion of OVC. The difference between these studies appears to be in the 
denominator: Schubert uses as a denominator the set of beneficiaries; Stewart and Handa 
the universe of potential beneficiaries under alternative strategies. 
Methods 
This paper compares the performance of CSGs and OAPs on a number of key 
decision criteria from a welfare economics perspective. Using national household survey 
data and micro-simulations, estimates are provided of the cost, number of recipients, and 
poverty impacts of OAPs and CSGs in four countries: Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and 
Uganda. A key criterion is the progressiveness of the benefits realized under the 
alternative programs, i.e., the extent to which individuals in poorer households benefit 
relative to their baseline consumption levels as compared to individuals that are better 
off. The analysis relies on average effects – within households for changes in per capita 
consumption and across the population for the poverty indicators – intrahousehold 
resource allocation decisions are not modeled, so the question of which individual in the 
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household to provide the transfer is not addressed. Rather, the assumption is that the 
benefits accrue to the household and are evenly distributed, on average, among the 
household’s residents.   
Nationally representative household expenditure surveys from four Eastern & 
Southern Africa countries are used to compare the costs, reach and poverty impacts of 
alternative universal social grants. Six different social grant schemes are assessed. For 
CSGs, grants are simulated grants for three age categories (age 5 and under, age 10 and 
under, and age 17 and under), while for the OAP I also simulate grants for three different 
age categories (age 70+, age 65+ and age 60+). Microsimulations of each strategy in each 
country yields results relative to a baseline assumption of having no program; comparison 
of the results across schemes allows inferences to be drawn regarding the performance of 
each program against specific policy objectives. The policy objectives of interest are the 
total cost of the scheme and the welfare impact – the distribution of benefits and relative 
increases in consumption. Indirect beneficiaries are defined as individuals who reside in a 
household that receives a grant but is not directly targeted by the grant assistance, e.g. 
prime-aged adults who live in a household with a child under a CSG or an elderly relative 
under an OAP. Indirect beneficiaries are important to the assessment of program 
performance: since the cash grant is given to the household and not to the individual 
directly targeted by the grant, the grants have broader welfare impacts than would be 
captured by a simple count of the targeted individuals.  
Program parameters 
A social grant must strike a balance between providing sufficient resources to 
pursue a policy objective and avoiding distortion of consumption patterns. In this study, 
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the daily per person transfer level is set at ten percent of the national (daily) poverty line. 
This is considered to be a “low transfer scenario;” other analyses have experimented with 
15 percent and 20 percent transfer levels, which essentially inflate costs proportionately 
but have larger poverty impacts. Other analysis (UNICEF-ESARO 2008) indicates that 
average transfer levels for CT programs in Latin America and Africa, as a percentage of 
the national poverty line, range from about 20-30 percent in the relatively richer Latin 
American countries down to about 10-15 percent in the Africa programs. The UNICEF 
study further notes that because the targeted CT programs in Africa have tended to focus 
resources on the poorest of the poor whose consumption is half (or less) of the poverty 
line, those transfers likely represent about 30 percent of the average consumption of 
recipients, and so are similar in relative terms to the transfer levels in Latin America. 
Hence placing the transfer value at ten percent of the national poverty line is consistent 
with both international experience and what is currently occurring in Africa.  
While a truly universal grant would be ideal to simulate, in practice 100 percent 
coverage is unlikely due both to demand and supply side constraints. On the demand side, 
the wealthiest households may not sign up for the grant; supply side constraints include 
administrative capacity to implement the program. The grant is restricted to households 
with eligible individuals in the bottom eight deciles of the per capita consumption 
distribution, thus excluding the wealthiest two deciles. Supply side constraints are more 
likely to affect the poorest deciles rather than the richest, but operational efficiency is 
assumed here to examine expected outcomes under the best case scenario. The poverty 
effects estimated under this best case scenario, as argued below, result in an exaggeration 
of the relative performance of the OAP since the elderly are more likely to be in the top 
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two deciles relative to children in the countries under study. Finally, the total grant to the 
household is capped at the sum of three individual transfers, i.e., no household can 
receive more than three grants. Capping the total grant recognizes potential economies of 
scale in consumption at the household level, the reality of the budget constraint and the 
need to assure wide coverage of the program. In practice, limiting the number of grants 
per household would avoid perverse fertility incentives under a CSG. This assumption 
understates the relative poverty impact of a truly universal CSG because children are 
more likely to live in households with more than two other children, while pensioners 
rarely live in households with more than two other pensioners.  
 Efficiency of alternative targeting strategies 
Upon identification of recipient households and the number of eligible individuals 
in each household, the total number of individuals who would benefit from the grant is 
estimated using household or population weights, as appropriate. These results are used 
to estimate changes in the poverty headcount ratio (H), poverty gap ratio (PG), and 
squared poverty gap ratio (SPG) that would result from a specific targeting strategy. 
These measures are calculated by the following formulas (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 
1984). The headcount poverty ratio measures the proportion of the population living 
below the poverty line: 
∑
∑=
i
h
H i  
where i represents individuals in the population and h individuals with per capita 
consumption below the poverty line. Summations for all three measures are over i, or 
across the population represented by the household sample. In practice, these measures 
are derived using population weights calculated as the product of household size and 
(1) 
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sample household weight. The poverty gap ratio, which measures the proportional 
difference between per capita consumption and the poverty line for those in poverty, is 
calculated by: 
 
( )∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
povline
pcpovlinehPG ii *  
 
where povline is the poverty line in each country, expressed in local currency, and pc is 
per capita consumption for the individual i. Finally, the squared poverty gap ratio is: 
 
( ) 2
*∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
povline
pcpovlinehSPG ii  
 
By squaring the difference between per capita consumption and the poverty line, SPG 
places greater emphasis on the welfare of individuals in the poorest households. A 
decrease in any of the three measures represents an improvement in poverty. PG and SPG 
are important measures to take into account. In targeted cash transfer programs the 
transfers often are not enough to move a household over the poverty line, but do reduce 
the distance from the poverty line. While changes in the poverty headcount ratio will be 
observed under universal cash grant programs, PG and SPG provide measures of the 
progressiveness of alternative programs as they indicate the impact on the poorest of the 
poor. 
The progressiveness of each scheme is an important criterion for policy-makers 
and development partners when deciding among alternative grants that can be justified on 
(2) 
(3) 
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human rights grounds. The performance of alternative targeting strategies also is assessed 
by estimating the mean increase in consumption of all beneficiaries, in sum and by 
wealth decile, and the share of recipient households in the bottom three deciles of the per 
capita consumption distribution. Ceteris paribus, policy makers and development 
partners should be interested in implementing a program whose benefits are more 
progressively distributed, thus reducing inequality and poverty by more than alternative, 
less progressive programs.  
Data and summary statistics 
Data 
Household income and expenditure surveys from Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique 
and Uganda and Zambia are used for this analysis. Specifically, they are the Kenya 
Integrated Household Budget Survey (2005-06); the Second Integrated Household 
Survey (IHS) from Malawi (2004); the Inquerito aos Agregados Familiares 2002-03 
(IAF) from Mozambique; and the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) (2005-
06). These surveys are similar in structure; they are cross-sectional in nature and support 
nationally representative analysis.  
The policy variable of interest in these analyses is per capita consumption, 
calculated as the household’s aggregate consumption divided by household size. 
Although receipt of a cash transfer represents an increase in income, use of the 
consumption variable helps to avoid problems associated with underreporting of income 
and measurement of household production. The household consumption aggregates 
employed are those calculated by the national statistics offices that manage the surveys. 
Consumption aggregates are adjusted for local prices, so that the purchasing power of 
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equal consumption levels is equivalent across sample clusters within country. Per capita 
consumption is used to calculate the population-weighted decile rank of individuals.   
Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the data supporting the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Though one cannot compare poverty lines and, hence, poverty rates between countries 
directly, due to differences that may exist in the consumption basket used to calculate 
poverty lines, these data offer some useful comparisons across country and may have 
some predictive value regarding the comparative results of the analysis.  
Total GDP is much higher in Kenya at USD 24 billion than in the other three 
countries. Malawi’s GDP is USD 3 billion; Mozambique’s is USD 6 billion and 
Uganda’s is USD 10 billion. These figures are in 2007 USD and are calculated by 
inflating the local currency GDP figure at the time of the survey year by the local price 
index (IMF 2009), and then converting to USD at the 2007 exchange rate (OANDA 
2009). Kenya’s poverty line represents consumption of about one dollar per day, while 
the other three countries all have poverty lines of approximately half that. Similarly, per 
capita consumption in Kenya, USD 36, is twice that of the other countries, which all have 
per capita consumption levels around USD 18. Kenya experienced strong economic 
growth in the middle years of this decade, but this is projected to level off sharply in 2008 
and 2009, possibly because of political conflict. As of April 2009, the other countries’ 
economies were expected to continue at recent rates.  
Examination of the baseline poverty indicators suggest that larger numbers of the 
poor will benefit from transfers under universal grants in Malawi and Mozambique than 
in the other two countries in this study, but this is misleading due to variation in 
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population size. Mozambique has the highest poverty headcount ratio (H = 0.54) and the 
highest squared poverty gap ratio (SPG = 0.10): not only does a larger proportion of the 
population live below the poverty line in Mozambique, but the gap between per capita 
consumption and the poverty line is greater in Mozambique for the poorest individuals. 
Malawi’s poverty indicators are similar. However, the countries with the lower poverty 
headcount ratios, Kenya and Uganda, also have substantially larger populations. 
Approximately 16.3 million people live below the poverty line in Kenya and 10.1 million 
in Uganda, as compared to 6.4 million and 9.9 million in Malawi and Mozambique, 
respectively. 
Table 2 reports sub-group rates for the six demographic groups considered in this 
paper. First, for all countries, the incidence of poverty is higher in households with 
children then in households with elderly residents. Second, in all countries except Kenya, 
households with elderly residents have a lower incidence of poverty then the average 
household; for all countries, the incidence of poverty in households with children is 
greater then the average. Further, in Kenya and Malawi, the incidence of poverty 
increases as larger groups of children are considered (0-5 to 0-17) and, with the addition 
of Mozambique, poverty rates decrease as larger groups of the elderly are considered 
(70+ to 60+). These findings suggest that targeting children with universal cash grants 
will have a greater poverty effect than targeting the elderly.  
Results 
Key criteria that decision makers would consider are the budget implications and 
welfare impacts. Welfare impacts are assessed in terms of the progressiveness of benefits 
– their distribution and relative increases in consumption – and poverty effects. Table 3 
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reports the number of beneficiary households, the number of individuals targeted, and 
budget requirements under each social grant. Table 4 reports coverage data.  
Differences in the budget implications between the CSG and OAP are stark, but 
the total cost of the most liberal program is not impossible. Universal CSGs require 
resources nearly an order of magnitude greater than those required by universal OAPs 
(Table 3, column 5). For example, in Kenya a 0-17 CSG would cost USD 405 million, 
while a 60+ OAP would cost USD 65 million. In Malawi these figures would be USD 78 
million and USD 10 million, respectively. Still, only 1.6 to 2.6 percent of GDP is 
required to fund the 0-17 CSG (Table 3, column 6). The proportion of GDP required to 
fund a 60+ OAP, at 0.2-0.34 percent, is considerably less than the generally accepted 
budget for targeted CTs of 0.5 percent of GDP, suggesting that OAPs make insufficient 
use of the available fiscal space.5  
There are clear differences in the proportions of households that would receive 
transfers under alternative social grant scenarios. In three of the countries – the exception 
is Kenya – the most inclusive CSG would reach about two-thirds of all households in 
these countries (Table 3, column 4), and virtually every single household in the bottom 
three deciles of the national consumption distribution (Table 4, column 4); the 0-17 CSG 
is thus strongly progressive in its distribution of benefits. More restrictive CSG schemes 
(0-5, 0-10) reach fewer households altogether, and a smaller share in the bottom three 
deciles, though the difference between the 0-10 and 0-17 CSG is not large. The OAP is 
less progressive. The most inclusive (60+) OAP reaches only 15-18 percent of all 
households (Table 3, column 4), and only 20-30 percent of households in the bottom 
three deciles (Table 4, column 4). These findings are in keeping with the position in the 
                                                            
5 Chapter 2 of the dissertation explores the effects of CTs under a fixed budget tied to GDP.  
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consumption distribution of households containing elderly – households with elderly 
members tend to be wealthier on average, as measured by per capita consumption, than 
households with children.  
 Further evidence of the relative progressiveness of CSGs is provided through 
comparison of columns 1 and 2 in Table 4. These results indicate that households with 
children are significantly larger than those containing elderly members and tend to have a 
higher number of targeted members. The average number of grants to a recipient 
household under a CSG approaches 2.5 for the 0-17 CSG, compared to about 1.2 for the 
60+ OAP. Simple subtraction across columns indicates that the OAP households have 
more non-targeted members than CSG households, so the total number of indirect 
beneficiaries may be larger under an OAP than under a CSG that benefits the same 
number of households. However, the increase in per capita consumption (Table 4, 
column 3; and Appendix A) clearly indicates greater welfare increases for individuals in 
CSG households than for those in OAP households, with proportional increases in per 
capita consumption ranging 73-100 percent higher for the 0-17 CSG than for the 60+ 
OAP.  
One argument put forth by advocates for social pensions is that the elderly are 
often responsible for raising children, especially when prime-age mortality is high due to 
AIDS, thus social pensions provide substantial benefits to children, particularly orphans. 
This proposition is examined in the last three columns of Table 4 (see also Appendix C). 
Indeed, 70-80 percent of households with a member aged 60+ also contain at least one 
child under age 18. In contrast, only about 18% of households with a child under 18 also 
contain an elderly person age 60+. Hence, while the majority of households eligible to 
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receive an OAP would have a resident child, many children – and many vulnerable 
children given the difference in the consumption distribution of beneficiary households – 
would be missed under an OAP that would otherwise receive benefits under a CSG. In 
particular, approximately 80 percent of orphans would be covered under a 0-17 CSG, but 
only a quarter of orphans would benefit under a 60+ OAP (results not shown). Since 
orphans tend to be evenly distributed across consumption deciles in the study countries, 
80 percent coverage includes all orphans in eligible households. 
The poverty effect of each type of social grant is reported in Table 5. The top 
panel shows baseline and estimated levels of each indicator while the bottom panel 
reports the percentage change from the baseline. The results are not surprising given 
evidence provided so far regarding the budget requirements for each type of grant and the 
distribution of beneficiaries. In each country, a CSG would reach more households and 
individuals given the demographic structure of these countries, and would reach more 
households in the poorer deciles since child poverty rates are higher than elderly poverty 
rates. Thus, the poverty impacts of a CSG are far greater than those from an OAP. A CSG 
would have the largest poverty impacts in Kenya and the smallest in Mozambique. In 
Kenya for example, the 0-17 CSG would reduce H, PG and SPG by 7.6%, 14.1% and 
19.8% respectively. In Mozambique, the comparable figures are 4.6%, 10.7% and 15.5% 
respectively. The impacts for Malawi and Uganda fall between these two ranges. On the 
other hand, the most inclusive OAP (60+) also would have its largest poverty impact in 
Kenya, but now the reductions in H, PG and SPG are 1.1%, 2.5% and 3.7% respectively. 
Recall that the cost (and number of recipients) for the OAP is about one-twelfth (or 8%) 
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that of the CSG; the relative welfare impact of the OAP tends to be one-seventh that of 
the CSG, though there is some variation across countries and specific indicators.    
Discussion and Policy Implications 
Social protection has become an increasingly important part of the social policy 
dialogue in sub-Saharan Africa, largely in response to the social costs of HIV/AIDS. 
Economists argue that social protection can contribute directly to growth, by addressing 
market failures such as imperfect credit markets, by reducing inequality and thus crime 
and violence, which can affect entrepreneurship and business climate. Human rights 
activists argue that social protection ought to be part of the basic package of services that 
governments provide for citizens, and that state parties have committed to ensuring a 
minimum standard of living to its most marginal and vulnerable citizens through the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
related covenants. Children and the elderly are oft-cited examples of vulnerable groups 
that should be afforded a social grant. With limited budgets, a key question is to whom 
governments should first extend social protection? This paper provides useful 
comparative analysis regarding the costs and potential benefits of a CSG and OAP using 
data from four countries in East and southern Africa. The results point to some very clear 
differences in both costs and the welfare gains under these alternative schemes.  
Holding the size of the grant constant, a CSG will cost significantly more than an 
OAP due primarily to the demographic structure of African countries: there simply are 
more children than elderly. But the age of individuals is strongly correlated with poverty, 
and children are far more likely to live in poor households than the elderly in these four 
countries. Consequently, the most inclusive CSG, covering children aged 0-17, will reach 
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almost all households in the poorest three deciles while the most inclusive (60+) OAP 
will reach only a fifth to a quarter of households in the poorest three deciles. The result is 
that the overall poverty impact of a CSG is much greater than that of an OAP.  
Advocates of OAPs argue that OAPs reduce fertility incentives by providing old-
age security and this, in the long term, contributes to child welfare. However, the near 
term development impact of the CSG via improved health, dietary and nutritional status 
and educational attainment for children would be both more substantial and more 
immediate than the impact from the OAP, again given the age structure of beneficiary 
households, as well as the age-specific life expectancy of the target group.  
OAP advocates argue further that OAPs will benefit children since the elderly are 
increasingly caring for children due to prime-age mortality caused by AIDS. However, 
this analysis shows that a much larger proportion of children (80%) may be missed under 
an OAP than the proportion of elderly who would be missed (25%) under a CSG (see 
Table 4, columns 6&7, and Appendix C). Moreover, the simulation results indicate much 
stronger welfare effects from programs that target households with children. Hence, the 
trade-offs between the two programs, both in terms of numbers of beneficiaries and 
poverty effects, favor initiating progressive implementation of CTs for social protection 
through a CSG.  
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Table 4.2: Poverty headcount ratio by target group             
               
      Children      Adults   
   All  0‐17  0‐10  0‐5  60+  65+  70+ 
               
Kenya  0.459  0.507  0.498  0.479  0.498  0.503  0.501 
Malawi  0.524  0.582  0.584  0.558  0.494  0.493  0.489 
Mozambique  0.541  0.582  0.595  0.597  0.480  0.499  0.500 
Uganda  0.351  0.380  0.395  0.394  0.331  0.324  0.312 
               
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics, by country    
  
Kenya
2005/6 
Malawi
2004 
Mozambique 
2002/3 
Uganda
2005/6 
Poverty analysis         
Population (million)  35.5  12.2  18.3  30.0 
GDP (2007 USD billion)  24.57  3.02  6.02  10.34 
Poverty line, monthly (USD)  29.78  14.24  14.07  14.19 
Per capita consumption, monthly (USD)  35.65  18.61  17.97  18.12 
Baseline poverty indicators         
Poverty headcount ratio  0.459  0.524   0.541   0.351 
Poverty gap ratio  0.163  0.178   0.205   0.105 
Squared poverty gap ratio  0.081  0.080   0.103   0.044 
Household size (mean)  5.1  4.5  4.8  5.3 
Households in sample  13,158  11,280  8,700  7,421 
Price inflator 2007:survey year  1.083  1.466  1.547  1.081 
USD Exchange rate 2007  67  139  27  1701 
Notes: Gross domestic product values obtained from the IMF (2009). Summary statistics for the 
poverty analysis are computed using population weights derived from household weights and 
household size. Monetary data are given in USD 2007.  
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Table 4.3: Number of beneficiaries and budget requirements under alternative grant schemes 
  
households 
reached 
Individuals 
targeted 
Share of 
all 
individuals 
targeted 
(%) 
Share of all 
households 
reached (%) 
Total Cost 
(2007 USD) 
Total Cost 
as Percent 
of GDP 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Kenya              
children 0‐5  3,017,478  5,052,424  14.23  43.24  202,152,240  0.82 
children 0‐10  3,803,646  8,062,356  22.71  54.51  315,352,160  1.28 
children 0‐17  4,383,840  10,467,840  29.49  62.82  405,475,680  1.65 
adults 70+  653,417  733,296  2.07  9.36  30,880,088  0.13 
adults 65+  948,027  1,106,245  3.12  13.59  46,315,900  0.19 
adults 60+  1,273,150  1,561,255  4.40  18.25  64,902,840  0.26 
Malawi              
children 0‐5  1,308,372  2,092,291  17.15  48.57  40,222,308  1.33 
children 0‐10  1,617,553  3,428,108  28.10  60.05  64,104,068  2.12 
children 0‐17  1,783,434  4,214,405  34.54  66.21  78,106,448  2.59 
adults 70+  213,433  247,597  2.03  7.92  4,960,096  0.16 
adults 65+  298,483  360,401  2.95  11.08  7,178,233  0.24 
adults 60+  410,479  519,769  4.26  15.24  10,284,094  0.34 
Mozambique             
children 0‐5  1,924,141  3,220,018  17.60  50.52  61,398,560  1.02 
children 0‐10  2,333,169  5,035,773  27.52  61.26  93,718,248  1.56 
children 0‐17  2,545,344  6,145,387  33.58  66.83  113,340,192  1.88 
adults 70+  238,100  260,636  1.42  6.25  5,250,290  0.09 
adults 65+  374,051  437,127  2.39  9.82  8,719,436  0.15 
adults 60+  597,038  719,328  3.93  15.68  14,285,529  0.24 
Uganda              
children 0‐5  2,729,051  5,021,082  16.74  52.19  97,556,808  0.94 
children 0‐10  3,231,252  7,479,942  24.93  61.79  142,407,200  1.38 
children 0‐17  3,528,482  8,989,910  29.97  67.48  169,910,304  1.64 
adults 70+  425,091  467,495  1.56  8.13  9,682,507  0.09 
adults 65+  620,971  709,487  2.36  11.88  14,609,808  0.14 
adults 60+  829,522  985,612  3.29  15.86  20,179,708  0.20 
Notes: Results presented are from analysis of the full household sample, using population weights.
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Table 4.5: Absolute value and percentage change in poverty indicators for alternative cash grants 
   Kenya  Malawi  Mozambique  Uganda 
   H  PG  SPG  H  PG  SPG  H  PG  SPG  H  PG  SPG 
Targeting Strategy                          
Baseline  0.459  0.163  0.081  0.524  0.178  0.080  0.541  0.205  0.103  0.351  0.105  0.044 
Children                         
 Aged 0‐5  0.444  0.152  0.073  0.512  0.167  0.072  0.530  0.193  0.094  0.337  0.096  0.039 
 Aged 0‐10  0.434  0.145  0.069  0.502  0.159  0.068  0.520  0.186  0.090  0.329  0.093  0.037 
 Aged 0‐17  0.424  0.140  0.065  0.497  0.156  0.065  0.516  0.183  0.087  0.327  0.091  0.036 
Adults                         
 Aged 70+  0.457  0.161  0.080  0.522  0.177  0.079  0.540  0.204  0.103  0.350  0.104  0.043 
 Aged 65+  0.456  0.160  0.079  0.521  0.176  0.079  0.539  0.204  0.102  0.350  0.104  0.043 
 Aged 60+  0.454  0.159  0.078  0.520  0.175  0.078  0.538  0.203  0.101  0.349  0.103  0.043 
                            
Percentage decrease from baseline                     
Children                         
 Aged 0‐5  3.27  6.75  9.88  2.29  6.18  10.00  2.03  5.85  8.74  3.99  8.57  11.36 
 Aged 0‐10  5.45  11.04  14.81  4.20  10.67  15.00  3.88  9.27  12.62  6.27  11.43  15.91 
 Aged 0‐17  7.63  14.11  19.75  5.15  12.36  18.75  4.62  10.73  15.53  6.84  13.33  18.18 
Adults                         
 Aged 70+  0.44  1.23  1.23  0.38  0.56  1.25  0.18  0.49  0.00  0.28  0.95  2.27 
 Aged 65+  0.65  1.84  2.47  0.57  1.12  1.25  0.37  0.49  0.97  0.28  0.95  2.27 
 Aged 60+  1.09  2.45  3.70  0.76  1.69  2.50  0.55  0.98  1.94  0.57  1.90  2.27 
Notes: Values for H, PG & SPG are obtained from micro-simulations as described in the text. Percentage decreases in 
the lower panel are computed using values in the upper panel of the table. 
 
 CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
This research was undertaken to inform our understanding of the social costs of 
HIV/AIDS, as indicated by potential differences in human capital – health and education 
– between orphans and non-orphans, and to compare alternative opportunities to mitigate 
vulnerability. I find that orphans typically are not different from other children in terms 
of nutritional status. Rather, household wealth and other aspects of household structure 
are stronger drivers of children’s nutritional wellbeing than orphan status. In comparisons 
of alternative targeting strategies for targeted cash transfer programs and universal cash 
grants, I find that targeting households with children confers greater benefits on children 
living in poverty than other targeting criteria that are being considered in southern Africa, 
including households with old-age residents, households with labor constraints, and 
households that include orphans.  
The research findings are somewhat contrary to a priori expectations and the 
evaluation results of selected pilot cash transfer programs. A priori expectations of 
deficiencies in human capital on the part of orphans as compared to non-orphans are 
indicated by policies that presumptively target orphans for assistance. Results of the 
nutrition analysis also are counter to the general sense of the literature that orphans 
typically experience enrolment and attendance deficits as compared to non-orphans. It is 
unclear whether my findings regarding nutritional status represent a null direct effect, or 
they reflect greater propensity of young orphans to be assimilated in fostering households 
than older ones – in which case human capital deficits may be 
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countered by active childcare, or they reflect differences between patterns of household 
production of children’s nutrition and education. 
Results of the cash transfer simulations are appropriately compared to evaluation 
results from the evaluations of pilot programs in southern Africa. The latter found that 
OVC benefit substantially through programs that target households with labor constraints 
or households that host the elderly. The difference is in the denominator: the pilot 
evaluations cite evidence that OVC comprise a large proportion of beneficiaries under 
alternative targeting strategies; this research shows that a large proportion of OVC – 
particularly poor, non-orphan children – would be missed because they do not reside in 
eligible households under these targeting strategies. 
In the context of current policy debates, particularly those regarding the targeting 
of cash transfers and sources of childhood vulnerability, these findings are important. The 
findings indicate that orphans are not necessarily different from other children in terms of 
human capital, and that assistance that targets orphans presumptively is inefficient. 
Presumptive targeting of orphans can miss substantial proportions of non-orphan children 
who are vulnerable from poverty, and may extend benefits to orphans who are less in 
need because they live in wealthier households. Indeed, my findings suggest that the 
focus should be on children vulnerable from poverty, regardless of orphan status. Further, 
it is insufficient to assume that vulnerable children will benefit on average from 
assistance programs that target benefits to the elderly or to households with labor 
constraints. While evaluation of targeted cash transfer programs that focus on households 
with elderly residents and labor constraints in pilot areas has found that OVC represent a 
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substantial proportion of beneficiaries, the work presented herein also demonstrates that 
such targeting strategies miss a substantial proportion of vulnerable children.  
Still, there are limitations to the research presented herein: more could be done to 
articulate the econometric models of nutritional status, even given existing data 
constraints; the claim in the third paper of a welfare economics perspective is perhaps 
overstated. The econometric models employed for the nutritional analysis represent a 
solid analysis so far as they go, but they fall short of full investigation. The fixed effects 
models do not add to the analysis; due to the inflation of the standard errors when adding 
the fixed effects, their results simply are uninformative and should not be overinterpreted. 
It would have been useful to execute random effects models, as well, and test for the 
consistency of estimates under the random effects assumption, i.e., that the individual 
effect is not correlated with the other regressors in the model. Hence, the preferred 
approach would have been, under each specification, to execute the random effects 
model, follow with the fixed effects model, and conduct a Hausman test to compare the 
two. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the random effects estimates are 
efficient. If the Hausman test fails to find a difference between the coefficient estimates 
under the two specifications, then one would choose the random effects models because 
they are more efficient. If the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis, then one would 
favor the fixed effects results because they are consistent.  
The third paper in the analysis, which compares old age pensions and universal 
child grants, asserts a welfare economics framework but fails to follow through in its 
analysis. The primary concern is the failure to articulate an underlying social welfare 
function that the policy maker seeks to optimize. Social welfare, in this case, should be 
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represented by more than increases in consumption; some improvement in the human 
situation, one that leads to improvements in the productivity of society, should be the 
objective of the cash transfers. Thus, it would be useful to include measures of child 
health in the simulations of the competing targeting strategies for cash transfers. Further, 
a cash transfer program, however well designed, is not the only available strategy for 
mitigating the poverty constraint in access to health services and education. For example, 
targeted subsidies to reduce prices at the point of service also mitigate poverty 
constraints.  
Optimization of the social welfare function across competing policy alternatives is 
challenging. One approach is to compare the administrative costs of alternative strategies 
that yield similar benefits. The analysis at hand incorporates administrative costs, but 
could do more to assess their effect on resource requirements. As presented, the analysis 
treats administrative costs as a fixed overhead rate; sensitivity analysis on the load factor 
would be useful. Even more informative would to consider a range of load factors for 
administrative costs and assess attendant differences in the overall cost and budget 
implications of the programs under comparison, e.g. cash transfers or targeted price 
subsidies. Rather than basing this on assumption, a range of load factors may be drawn 
from the published literature and evaluations of pilot programs.  
The work presented herein suggests a number of directions for future research. 
Future analyses of the DHS will marry the results of nutritional analysis to observations 
on enrolment status within the same populations; where methods allow, it would be of 
interest to determine whether enrolment and nutritional status are correlated within 
households. It is possible that households that benefit under an old age pension make 
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different resource allocation decisions, on average, than households that benefit under a 
universal child grant; there are inherent differences in household structure, as has been 
shown. Hence, comparison of old-age pensions and universal cash grants will be 
expanded to include simulation of the health effects of cash transfers, similar the 
enrolment simulation in the second paper. At the same time, sensitivity analysis will be 
conducted of the budget performance of alternative cash transfer programs to 
assumptions regarding the load factor for administrative costs.  
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Table A1A: Full HAZ Results for Kenya 
Controls included in model: baseline wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Kenya: HAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH -0.036 0.001 0.019 0.003 0.007    
(0.120) (0.122) (0.118) (0.121) (0.125)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 0.259 0.283 0.313 0.312 0.290    
(0.133) (0.134) (0.135) (0.137) (0.140)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 0.072 0.081 0.088 0.079 0.111    
(0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.088) (0.089)    
orphan      -0.077 -0.151 -0.683 
      (0.193) (0.598) (0.500) 
Sex 0.202 0.210 0.214 0.213 0.219 0.207 0.209 0.220 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Age 13-24 mos -1.126 -1.117 -1.126 -1.122 -1.128 -1.311 -1.313 -1.320 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.824 -0.816 -0.826 -0.818 -0.828 -0.963 -0.964 -0.987 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Poorer  0.124 0.047 0.047 0.05    
  (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073)    
Middle  0.191 0.104 0.098 0.111    
  (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070)    
Richer  0.295 0.176 0.172 0.183    
  (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.082)    
Richest  0.671 0.485 0.464 0.464    
  (0.083) (0.083) (0.085) (0.085)    
Max female educ, yrs  0.030 0.026 0.027    
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
Women of     0.064 0.080    
Reproductive age    (0.030) (0.033)    
Elder women    -0.029 0.04    
    (0.069) (0.084)    
Kids<13    -0.021 -0.024    
    (0.016) (0.016)    
Orphan x poorer       0.058 0.523 
     wealth quintile       (0.669) (0.575) 
Orphan x middle       1.093 1.703 
       (0.818) (0.751) 
Orphan x richer       0.046 0.601 
       (0.670) (0.630) 
Orphan x richest       -0.583 0.203 
       (0.660) (0.583) 
grandparent     -0.09   -0.461 
     (0.080)   (0.200) 
other relative     -0.2   -0.151 
     (0.127)   (0.199) 
Constant -0.606 -0.865 -0.976 -0.967 -0.976 -0.476 -0.482 -0.398 
 (0.048) (0.067) (0.080) (0.096) (0.096) (0.057) (0.057) (0.065) 
Observations 5028 5028 4977 4977 4938 5028 5028 4989 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0814 0.1078 0.1141 0.1148 0.1169 0.169 0.1705 0.1771 
Number of households     3489 3489 3465 
See notes to Table 2.2A for explanation of models. Coefficients in columns 6-8 are based on household level fixed effects models estimated on blended 
households only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in bold are significant at p < 0.05.  
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Table A1B: Full WAZ Results for Kenya 
Controls included in model: baseline wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Kenya: WAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH -0.074 -0.045 -0.056 -0.049 -0.015    
(0.101) (0.102) (0.098) (0.099) (0.103)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 0.13 0.158 0.212 0.210 0.202    
(0.118) (0.117) (0.112) (0.116) (0.119)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 0.149 0.156 0.151 0.170 0.203    
(0.077) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.077)    
orphan      -0.330 -0.269 -0.423 
      (0.180) (0.465) (0.531) 
Sex 0.166 0.176 0.183 0.182 0.188 0.184 0.185 0.198 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Age 13-24 mos -1.029 -1.015 -1.022 -1.020 -1.026 -1.212 -1.213 -1.211 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.874 -0.865 -0.868 -0.857 -0.866 -0.933 -0.935 -0.947 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Poorer  0.260 0.121 0.116 0.121    
  (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)    
middle  0.406 0.238 0.224 0.229    
  (0.063) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060)    
richer  0.497 0.265 0.248 0.261    
  (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)    
richest  0.861 0.528 0.479 0.479    
  (0.069) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)    
Female educ, yrs   0.054 0.050 0.050    
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Women of     0.055 0.080    
Reproductive age    (0.025) (0.029)    
Elder women    -0.068 0.025    
    (0.060) (0.074)    
Kids<13    -0.044 -0.046    
    (0.014) (0.014)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.196 0.099 
     wealth quintile       (0.555) (0.617) 
Orphan x middle       -0.448 -0.147 
       (0.888) (0.875) 
Orphan x richer       0.355 0.448 
       (0.513) (0.604) 
Orphan x richest       -0.134 0.127 
       (0.501) (0.590) 
grandparent     -0.145   -0.506 
     (0.074)   (0.174) 
other relative     -0.210   -0.111 
     (0.111)   (0.195) 
Constant -0.319 -0.718 -0.913 -0.803 -0.821 -0.224 -0.223 -0.146 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.062) (0.081) (0.081) (0.054) (0.054) (0.064) 
Observations 5112 5112 5061 5061 5022 5112 5112 5073 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0958 0.1476 0.1711 0.1737 0.175 0.1917 0.192 0.1955 
No. of households      3527 3527 3503 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A1C: Full WHZ Results for Kenya 
Controls included in model: baseline wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Kenya: WHZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
-0.097 -0.091 -0.128 -0.114 -0.084    
(0.095) (0.093) (0.092) (0.094) (0.096)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
-0.051 -0.039 0.022 0.013 0.017    
(0.109) (0.107) (0.103) (0.105) (0.110)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.099 0.101 0.094 0.126 0.141    
(0.071) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069)    
orphan      -0.307 -0.132 0.043 
      (0.188) (0.543) (0.552) 
Sex 0.112 0.119 0.122 0.120 0.124 0.133 0.135 0.142 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.493 -0.482 -0.484 -0.482 -0.483 -0.564 -0.563 -0.557 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.424 -0.419 -0.418 -0.406 -0.409 -0.402 -0.403 -0.401 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.067) (0.067) (0.069) 
poorer  0.224 0.101 0.091 0.095    
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)    
middle  0.403 0.238 0.219 0.216    
  (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)    
richer  0.441 0.225 0.200 0.207    
  (0.066) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)    
richest  0.610 0.309 0.252 0.253    
  (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071)    
Female educ, yrs   0.049 0.045 0.045    
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Women of     0.040 0.057    
Reproductive age    (0.024) (0.026)    
Elder women    -0.053 0.002    
    (0.058) (0.073)    
Kids<13    -0.055 -0.054    
    (0.012) (0.012)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.432 -0.4 
     wealth quintile       (0.638) (0.638) 
Orphan x middle       -1.124 -1.192 
       (0.789) (0.761) 
Orphan x richer       0.279 -0.013 
       (0.584) (0.602) 
Orphan x richest       0.225 0.062 
       (0.553) (0.567) 
grandparent     -0.091   -0.334 
     (0.062)   (0.154) 
other relative     -0.128   0.011 
     (0.112)   (0.212) 
Constant 0.04 -0.287 -0.461 -0.296 -0.312 0.053 0.055 0.097 
 (0.049) (0.061) (0.064) (0.080) (0.081) (0.058) (0.058) (0.069) 
Observations 5192 5192 5134 5134 5095 5192 5192 5152 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0264 0.0586 0.0797 0.0839 0.0829 0.0468 0.0496 0.0492 
No. of households      3576 3576 3551 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A2A: Full HAZ Results for Lesotho 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Lesotho HAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.012 0.058 0.051 0.107 0.103    
(0.149) (0.151) (0.151) (0.157) (0.159)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
0.015 0.042 0.058 0.049 0.051    
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
-0.016 0.005 -0.003 0.031 0.04    
(0.088) (0.086) (0.086) (0.092) (0.096)    
orphan      -0.052 -0.021 0.036 
      (0.242) (0.530) (0.516) 
Sex 0.155 0.158 0.157 0.158 0.156 0.202 0.212 0.165 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.117) (0.120) (0.118) 
Age 13-24 mos -1.138 -1.145 -1.155 -1.171 -1.170 -1.218 -1.219 -1.217 
 (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.184) (0.185) (0.185) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.956 -0.945 -0.937 -0.950 -0.953 -1.076 -1.078 -1.071 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) 
poorer  0.028 0.009 0.006 0.009    
  (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)    
middle  0.284 0.251 0.243 0.249    
  (0.102) (0.104) (0.106) (0.106)    
richer  0.501 0.450 0.428 0.428    
  (0.098) (0.107) (0.109) (0.109)    
richest  0.586 0.501 0.463 0.478    
  (0.110) (0.122) (0.125) (0.127)    
Female educ, yrs   0.023 0.030 0.030    
   (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)    
Women of     -0.051 -0.048    
Reproductive age    (0.040) (0.041)    
Elder women    0.015 0.01    
    (0.073) (0.086)    
Kids<13    -0.035 -0.035    
    (0.025) (0.025)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.095 -0.159 
     wealth quintile       (0.668) (0.654) 
Orphan x middle       0.293 0.212 
       (0.795) (0.800) 
Orphan x richer       -0.876 -0.933 
       (0.571) (0.562) 
Orphan x richest       0.302 0.213 
       (0.667) (0.659) 
grandparent     -0.004   -0.283 
     (0.082)   (0.254) 
other relative     -0.006   -0.13 
     (0.123)   (0.312) 
Constant -0.897 -1.138 -1.273 -1.139 -1.137 -0.826 -0.826 -0.675 
 (0.081) (0.104) (0.128) (0.146) (0.150) (0.118) (0.119) (0.184) 
Observations 1721 1721 1718 1718 1711 1721 1721 1714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0973 0.1246 0.1263 0.1284 0.1283 0.1806 0.1838 0.1805 
No. of households      3489 3489 3465 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A2B: Full WAZ Results for Lesotho 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Lesotho WAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.021 0.066 0.054 0.096 0.085    
(0.140) (0.139) (0.138) (0.146) (0.148)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
0.012 0.041 0.06 0.054 0.047    
(0.093) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.095)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.08 0.1 0.087 0.112 0.101    
(0.079) (0.078) (0.077) (0.084) (0.085)    
orphan      -0.118 0.182 0.164 
      (0.228) (0.495) (0.501) 
Sex 0.032 0.037 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.078 0.085 0.078 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.107) (0.109) (0.108) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.837 -0.845 -0.854 -0.865 -0.864 -0.930 -0.931 -0.927 
 (0.093) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.911 -0.895 -0.886 -0.893 -0.889 -0.906 -0.908 -0.902 
 (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.133) (0.131) (0.133) 
poorer  0.067 0.032 0.029 0.035    
  (0.086) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086)    
middle  0.278 0.224 0.217 0.221    
  (0.087) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)    
richer  0.445 0.361 0.342 0.348    
  (0.091) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)    
richest  0.619 0.487 0.457 0.463    
  (0.108) (0.121) (0.124) (0.125)    
Female educ, yrs  0.034 0.038 0.037     
   (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)    
Women of     -0.025 -0.03    
Reproductive age    (0.037) (0.038)    
Elder women    0.017 0.004    
    (0.062) (0.075)    
Kids<13    -0.035 -0.034    
    (0.022) (0.022)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.727 -0.692 
     wealth quintile       (0.565) (0.574) 
Orphan x middle       0.1 0.135 
       (0.770) (0.781) 
Orphan x richer       -1.018 -1 
       (0.672) (0.677) 
Orphan x richest       0.046 -0.01 
       (0.647) (0.666) 
grandparent     0.017   0.041 
     (0.074)   (0.262) 
other relative     0.159   -0.13 
     (0.105)   (0.301) 
Constant -0.351 -0.599 -0.792 -0.678 -0.686 -0.319 -0.321 -0.327 
 (0.071) (0.088) (0.108) (0.124) (0.127) (0.117) (0.118) (0.180) 
Observations 1752 1752 1749 1749 1741 1752 1752 1744 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0878 0.117 0.1211 0.122 0.1223 0.1435 0.1512 0.1495 
No. of households      1364 1364 1359 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A3A: Full HAZ Results for Malawi 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Lesotho WHZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.001 0.016 0.012 0.033 0.012    
(0.130) (0.128) (0.129) (0.139) (0.140)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
0.028 0.04 0.054 0.054 0.042    
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.087) (0.088)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.105 0.114 0.104 0.118 0.09    
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.080) (0.082)    
orphan      -0.127 0.465 0.41 
      (0.209) (0.291) (0.285) 
Sex 0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 0.019 0.021 0.051 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.290 -0.296 -0.301 -0.305 -0.312 -0.149 -0.147 -0.151 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.106) (0.188) (0.189) (0.189) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.469 -0.462 -0.454 -0.453 -0.453 -0.279 -0.279 -0.280 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.135) (0.133) (0.134) 
poorer  0.082 0.053 0.05 0.052    
  (0.079) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)    
middle  0.135 0.091 0.085 0.084    
  (0.084) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)    
richer  0.180 0.111 0.098 0.101    
  (0.084) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089)    
richest  0.312 0.209 0.192 0.199    
  (0.098) (0.108) (0.110) (0.111)    
Female educ, yrs   0.026 0.025 0.026    
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)    
Women of     0.008 -0.002    
Reproductive age    (0.029) (0.030)    
Elder women    0 -0.032    
    (0.069) (0.084)    
Kids<13    -0.027 -0.027    
    (0.020) (0.020)    
Orphan x poorer       -1.215 -1.113 
     wealth quintile       (0.456) (0.447) 
Orphan x middle       -0.582 -0.472 
       (0.570) (0.568) 
Orphan x richer       -0.571 -0.516 
       (0.717) (0.716) 
Orphan x richest       -0.211 -0.309 
       (0.469) (0.477) 
grandparent     0.056   0.083 
     (0.080)   (0.210) 
other relative     0.211   -0.341 
     (0.102)   (0.246) 
Constant 0.274 0.148 0.005 0.073 0.061 0.173 0.164 0.147 
 (0.085) (0.098) (0.118) (0.127) (0.128) (0.131) (0.131) (0.180) 
Observations 1780 1780 1776 1776 1768 1780 1780 1771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.0287 0.031 0.0303 0.0326 0.0154 0.027 0.0331 
No. of households      1380 1380 1374 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
122 
 
Table A3A: Full HAZ Results for Malawi 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Malawi WHZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.047 0.027 -0.028 -0.024 -0.038    
(0.131) (0.129) (0.123) (0.126) (0.132)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
-0.057 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.008    
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) (0.105)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.093 0.039 0.049 0.051 0.042    
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.052)    
orphan      0.205 0.497 0.686 
      (0.201) (0.401) (0.379) 
Sex 0.144 0.138 0.147 0.147 0.141 0.198 0.199 0.202 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
Age 13-24 mos -1.220 -1.235 -1.241 -1.242 -1.244 -1.488 -1.489 -1.503 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.979 -1.001 -1.004 -1.002 -0.996 -1.151 -1.153 -1.156 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) 
poorer  0.05 0.059 0.059 0.057    
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)    
middle  0.137 0.133 0.134 0.131    
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)    
richer  0.317 0.303 0.305 0.300    
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)    
richest  0.625 0.586 0.587 0.585    
  (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)    
Female educ, yrs   0.007 0.006 0.006    
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Women of     0.025 0.018    
Reproductive age    (0.030) (0.032)    
Elder women    -0.005 -0.024    
    (0.053) (0.067)    
Kids<13    -0.01 -0.01    
    (0.012) (0.013)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.527 -0.811 
     wealth quintile       (0.507) (0.529) 
Orphan x middle       -0.334 -0.693 
       (0.567) (0.552) 
Orphan x richer       0.154 0.045 
       (0.669) (0.688) 
Orphan x richest       -0.547 -0.749 
       (0.615) (0.601) 
grandparent     0.034   0.007 
     (0.065)   (0.168) 
other relative     -0.004   0.214 
     (0.098)   (0.224) 
Constant -1.084 -1.259 -1.283 -1.277 -1.266 -0.953 -0.955 -0.955 
 (0.040) (0.054) (0.058) (0.073) (0.072) (0.053) (0.054) (0.061) 
Observations 8629 8629 8552 8552 8378 8629 8629 8451 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0949 0.1142 0.1156 0.1154 0.1154 0.194 0.1944 0.1983 
No. of households      6290 6290 6185 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A2C: Full WHZ Results for Lesotho 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Malawi WAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.07 0.051 0.033 0.029 0.007    
(0.099) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.104)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
-0.071 -0.022 -0.019 -0.019 -0.013    
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.129 0.094 0.088 0.085 0.079    
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)    
orphan      0.274 0.178 0.191 
      (0.176) (0.362) (0.393) 
Sex 0.086 0.081 0.086 0.086 0.076 0.05 0.048 0.039 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.952 -0.962 -0.974 -0.974 -0.973 -1.110 -1.111 -1.116 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.792 -0.806 -0.805 -0.805 -0.802 -0.818 -0.819 -0.819 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) 
poorer  0.113 0.111 0.112 0.114    
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)    
middle  0.161 0.147 0.147 0.143    
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)    
richer  0.232 0.200 0.200 0.197    
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)    
richest  0.485 0.415 0.414 0.415    
  (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)    
Female educ, yrs   0.014 0.014 0.013    
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Women of     0.003 -0.001    
Reproductive age    (0.025) (0.026)    
Elder women    0.007 -0.008    
    (0.043) (0.057)    
Kids<13    0.002 0.001    
    (0.010) (0.011)    
Orphan x poorer       0.052 -0.117 
     wealth quintile       (0.476) (0.493) 
Orphan x middle       0.401 0.188 
       (0.489) (0.478) 
Orphan x richer       0.081 0.019 
       (0.634) (0.678) 
Orphan x richest       -0.21 -0.242 
       (0.560) (0.576) 
grandparent     0.028   -0.005 
     (0.052)   (0.156) 
other relative     -0.043   0.162 
     (0.083)   (0.188) 
Constant -0.481 -0.646 -0.681 -0.690 -0.674 -0.410 -0.407 -0.398 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.046) (0.057) (0.057) (0.045) (0.046) (0.053) 
Observations 8888 8888 8808 8808 8625 8888 8888 8701 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0857 0.0995 0.1022 0.1019 0.101 0.145 0.1453 0.1459 
No. of households      6447 6447 6335 
otes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A3C: Full WHZ Results for Malawi 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Malawi WHZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.01 0.009 0.02 0.017 -0.026    
(0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.103)    
Orphans in non-blended 
HH 
-0.031 -0.021 -0.017 -0.016 -0.041    
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.086)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.083 0.085 0.070 0.068 0.061    
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041)    
orphan      0.142 -0.245 -0.322 
      (0.188) (0.320) (0.331) 
Sex 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.006 -0.064 -0.068 -0.083 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.427 -0.427 -0.432 -0.431 -0.426 -0.413 -0.416 -0.402 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.341 -0.341 -0.334 -0.335 -0.336 -0.283 -0.285 -0.271 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) 
poorer  0.082 0.074 0.073 0.079    
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)    
middle  0.072 0.056 0.055 0.052    
  (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)    
richer  0.02 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014    
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)    
richest  0.065 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004    
  (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)    
Female educ, yrs   0.013 0.014 0.014    
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Women of     -0.014 -0.021    
Reproductive age    (0.026) (0.027)    
Elder women    -0.004 -0.061    
    (0.047) (0.061)    
Kids<13    0.009 0.008    
    (0.011) (0.011)    
Orphan x poorer       0.675 0.682 
     wealth quintile       (0.523) (0.568) 
Orphan x middle       0.794 0.751 
       (0.472) (0.519) 
Orphan x richer       0.15 0.095 
       (0.597) (0.618) 
Orphan x richest       -0.04 0.28 
       (0.584) (0.573) 
grandparent     0.087   0.009 
     (0.052)   (0.152) 
other relative     -0.017   -0.189 
     (0.089)   (0.185) 
Constant 0.357 0.308 0.274 0.263 0.276 0.364 0.370 0.376 
 (0.042) (0.052) (0.053) (0.064) (0.063) (0.051) (0.051) (0.057) 
Observations 8892 8892 8812 8812 8626 8892 8892 8702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0154 0.0156 0.0165 0.0163 0.0162 0.0187 0.0201 0.0189 
No. of households      6450 6450 6337 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A4A: Full HAZ Results for Tanzania 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Tanzania HAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
-0.162 -0.184 -0.185 -0.229 -0.234    
(0.127) (0.121) (0.120) (0.118) (0.125)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
-0.03 0.036 0.073 0.091 0.113    
(0.139) (0.135) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.097 0.042 0.041 -0.018 -0.007    
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)    
orphan      -0.116 -0.193 -0.066 
      (0.208) (0.457) (0.434) 
Sex 0.115 0.118 0.115 0.116 0.110 0.156 0.156 0.158 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.931 -0.920 -0.923 -0.917 -0.915 -0.939 -0.939 -0.944 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.847 -0.846 -0.850 -0.852 -0.845 -0.875 -0.873 -0.871 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
poorer  0.038 0.039 0.052 0.042    
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053)    
middle  0.127 0.115 0.136 0.129    
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.050) (0.051)    
richer  0.361 0.337 0.364 0.359    
  (0.061) (0.060) (0.053) (0.053)    
richest  0.856 0.810 0.846 0.847    
  (0.062) (0.063) (0.057) (0.057)    
Female educ, yrs   0.011 0.011 0.012    
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Women of     0.015 0.031    
Reproductive age    (0.020) (0.020)    
Elder women    0.078 0.129    
    (0.041) (0.049)    
Kids<13    0.033 0.030    
    (0.010) (0.010)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.667 -0.972 
     wealth quintile       (0.591) (0.592) 
Orphan x middle       0.135 -0.047 
       (0.696) (0.727) 
Orphan x richer       0.641 0.664 
       (0.720) (0.810) 
Orphan x richest       0.222 0.216 
       (0.564) (0.558) 
grandparent     -0.129   -0.111 
     (0.057)   (0.121) 
other relative     -0.101   -0.13 
     (0.066)   (0.125) 
Constant -0.956 -1.202 -1.242 -1.409 -1.404 -0.945 -0.945 -0.919 
 (0.037) (0.059) (0.065) (0.056) (0.057) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) 
Observations 7910 7910 7851 7851 7643 7910 7910 7700 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0878 0.1417 0.1438 0.1492 0.1498 0.1562 0.1579 0.159 
No. of households      5203 5203 5110 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A4B: Full WAZ Results for Tanzania 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Tanzania WAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.017 0.003 -0.013 -0.044 0    
(0.091) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.103)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
-0.05 -0.011 -0.01 0.007 0.023    
(0.112) (0.109) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.123 0.092 0.098 0.054 0.069    
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041)    
Orphan      0.003 -0.019 0.082 
      (0.178) (0.358) (0.397) 
Sex 0.081 0.083 0.080 0.081 0.079 0.174 0.173 0.170 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.907 -0.901 -0.902 -0.898 -0.898 -0.951 -0.951 -0.950 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.793 -0.792 -0.794 -0.794 -0.796 -0.772 -0.773 -0.771 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Poorer  0.022 0.02 0.03 0.025    
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046)    
Middle  0.056 0.037 0.053 0.048    
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) (0.044)    
Richer  0.198 0.166 0.185 0.180    
  (0.050) (0.051) (0.045) (0.046)    
Richest  0.487 0.420 0.445 0.441    
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.052) (0.053)    
Female educ, yrs   0.014 0.014 0.014    
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)    
Women of     0.019 0.035    
Reproductive age    (0.018) (0.020)    
Elder women    0.039 0.077    
    (0.038) (0.043)    
Kids<13    0.023 0.022    
    (0.010) (0.010)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.225 -0.127 
     wealth quintile       (0.706) (0.734) 
Orphan x middle       0.181 -0.073 
       (0.611) (0.655) 
Orphan x richer       0.352 0.274 
       (0.435) (0.493) 
Orphan x richest       -0.156 -0.138 
       (0.472) (0.513) 
Grandparent     -0.086   -0.008 
     (0.045)   (0.102) 
other relative     -0.146   -0.182 
     (0.057)   (0.109) 
Constant -0.571 -0.706 -0.759 -0.885 -0.886 -0.604 -0.604 -0.593 
 (0.035) (0.052) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) 
Observations 7971 7971 7912 7912 7703 7971 7971 7760 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0975 0.1191 0.1217 0.1252 0.1263 0.1565 0.1568 0.1589 
No. of households      5235 5235 5141 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A4C: Full WHZ Results for Tanzania 
Controls included in model: Baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Tanzania WHZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.072 0.073 0.055 0.042 0.085    
(0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.093)    
Orphans in non-blended 
HH 
0.021 0.017 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001    
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.080 0.082 0.089 0.075 0.082    
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040)    
orphan      -0.031 -0.13 -0.135 
      (0.146) (0.333) (0.322) 
Sex 0.065 0.065 0.063 0.063 0.066 0.129 0.127 0.124 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.652 -0.653 -0.651 -0.651 -0.654 -0.671 -0.672 -0.664 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.478 -0.479 -0.477 -0.475 -0.483 -0.420 -0.422 -0.423 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
poorer  -0.025 -0.027 -0.026 -0.023    
  (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)    
middle  -0.033 -0.049 -0.045 -0.044    
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)    
richer  -0.042 -0.065 -0.059 -0.063    
  (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)    
richest  -0.058 -0.112 -0.110 -0.112    
  (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)    
Female educ, yrs   0.010 0.010 0.010    
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Women of     0.019 0.025    
Reproductive age    (0.016) (0.018)    
Elder women    0.017 0.021    
    (0.034) (0.041)    
Kids<13    0 0    
    (0.008) (0.008)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.159 0.04 
     wealth quintile       (0.508) (0.463) 
Orphan x middle       0.608 0.521 
       (0.445) (0.448) 
Orphan x richer       0.298 0.234 
       (0.423) (0.442) 
Orphan x richest       -0.121 -0.075 
       (0.452) (0.456) 
grandparent     -0.006   0.112 
     (0.039)   (0.105) 
other relative     -0.086   -0.115 
     (0.055)   (0.100) 
Constant 0.138 0.168 0.128 0.098 0.095 0.090 0.091 0.078 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) (0.041) (0.041) (0.048) 
Observations 8016 8016 7957 7957 7744 8016 8016 7801 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0485 0.0483 0.0494 0.0495 0.0505 0.0671 0.068 0.0677 
No. of households      5260 5260 5164 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A5A: Full HAZ Results for Zambia 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Zambia HAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.022 -0.004 -0.034 0.011 0.015    
(0.101) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.101)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
0.183 0.166 0.155 0.164 0.159    
(0.166) (0.163) (0.169) (0.170) (0.184)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.036 -0.019 -0.055 -0.011 -0.024    
(0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.054)    
orphan      -0.244 -0.272 -0.195 
      (0.175) (0.444) (0.432) 
Sex 0.088 0.092 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.119 0.117 0.131 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Age 13-24 mos -1.115 -1.127 -1.133 -1.141 -1.153 -1.371 -1.373 -1.367 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) 
Age 25-59 mos -1.044 -1.059 -1.069 -1.067 -1.079 -1.236 -1.238 -1.246 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
poorer  0.052 0.03 0.028 0.023    
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)    
middle  0.149 0.103 0.105 0.097    
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)    
richer  0.367 0.254 0.242 0.233    
  (0.063) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064)    
richest  0.746 0.569 0.550 0.555    
  (0.079) (0.083) (0.083) (0.085)    
Female educ, yrs   0.033 0.033 0.035    
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Women of     0.022 0.032    
Reproductive age    (0.025) (0.027)    
Elder women    -0.095 -0.062    
    (0.056) (0.069)    
Kids<13    -0.035 -0.037    
    (0.012) (0.013)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.559 -0.361 
     wealth quintile       (0.553) (0.548) 
Orphan x middle       0.51 0.368 
       (0.600) (0.631) 
Orphan x richer       0.032 0.064 
       (0.501) (0.504) 
Orphan x richest       0.769 0.856 
       (0.626) (0.657) 
grandparent     -0.038   -0.256 
     (0.065)   (0.128) 
other relative     -0.112   -0.402 
     (0.081)   (0.121) 
Constant -1.079 -1.257 -1.369 -1.273 -1.263 -0.910 -0.910 -0.855 
 (0.046) (0.060) (0.069) (0.075) (0.075) (0.053) (0.053) (0.059) 
Observations 5806 5806 5762 5762 5659 5806 5806 5702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1017 0.1293 0.1341 0.1358 0.1384 0.2279 0.2303 0.2332 
No. of households      3925 3925 3864 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A5B: Full WAZ Results for Zambia 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Zambia WAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
0.043 0.024 0.004 0.028 0.062    
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.082)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
0.02 0.011 0.02 0.029 0.083    
(0.114) (0.113) (0.118) (0.121) (0.129)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
0.006 -0.035 -0.056 -0.024 -0.015    
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050)    
orphan      -0.078 0.143 0.234 
      (0.134) (0.219) (0.214) 
Sex 0.037 0.038 0.042 0.041 0.035 0.072 0.072 0.072 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) 
Age 13-24 mos -1.034 -1.041 -1.045 -1.051 -1.062 -1.298 -1.300 -1.288 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.734 -0.743 -0.750 -0.745 -0.760 -0.853 -0.853 -0.860 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
poorer  0.047 0.035 0.036 0.032    
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)    
middle  0.135 0.105 0.108 0.103    
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)    
richer  0.305 0.228 0.218 0.214    
  (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)    
richest  0.538 0.418 0.405 0.399    
  (0.062) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065)    
Female educ, yrs   0.023 0.021 0.022    
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Women of     0.055 0.079    
Reproductive age    (0.020) (0.021)    
Elder women    -0.064 0.011    
    (0.043) (0.057)    
Kids<13    -0.040 -0.045    
    (0.011) (0.011)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.681 -0.535 
     wealth quintile       (0.395) (0.381) 
Orphan x middle       -0.425 -0.52 
       (0.398) (0.412) 
Orphan x richer       0.003 -0.006 
       (0.321) (0.349) 
Orphan x richest       0.186 0.153 
       (0.510) (0.557) 
grandparent     -0.116   -0.355 
     (0.060)   (0.131) 
other relative     -0.180   -0.433 
     (0.075)   (0.121) 
Constant -0.694 -0.838 -0.919 -0.843 -0.836 -0.582 -0.583 -0.504 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.060) (0.069) (0.070) (0.048) (0.048) (0.054) 
Observations 5969 5969 5925 5925 5822 5969 5969 5865 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0885 0.1083 0.1114 0.1142 0.1174 0.183 0.1848 0.1912 
No. of households      3995 3995 3934 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table A5C: Full WHZ Results for Zambia 
Controls included in model: baseline Wealth 
Female 
education Demographics Kinship Household Fixed Effects Models 
Zambia WHZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Orphans in blended HH 
-0.07 -0.072 -0.074 -0.076 -0.05    
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.076)    
Orphans in non-blended HH 
-0.157 -0.155 -0.139 -0.134 -0.064    
(0.118) (0.118) (0.123) (0.124) (0.132)    
Non-orphans in blended HH 
-0.006 -0.012 -0.012 -0.006 0.011    
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)    
orphan      -0.019 0.045 0.088 
      (0.112) (0.211) (0.210) 
Sex 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.025 0.04 0.041 0.028 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
Age 13-24 mos -0.628 -0.628 -0.626 -0.628 -0.631 -0.753 -0.753 -0.741 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Age 25-59 mos -0.220 -0.221 -0.219 -0.216 -0.221 -0.243 -0.242 -0.243 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
poorer  0.04 0.041 0.043 0.041    
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)    
middle  0.06 0.059 0.06 0.059    
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)    
richer  0.075 0.064 0.061 0.061    
  (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)    
richest  0.083 0.069 0.066 0.054    
  (0.052) (0.059) (0.058) (0.060)    
Female educ, yrs   0.004 0.001 0.002    
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Women of     0.039 0.056    
Reproductive age    (0.018) (0.019)    
Elder women    -0.008 0.045    
    (0.041) (0.049)    
Kids<13    -0.018 -0.022    
    (0.010) (0.010)    
Orphan x poorer       -0.138 -0.16 
     wealth quintile       (0.316) (0.325) 
Orphan x middle       -0.317 -0.338 
       (0.319) (0.325) 
Orphan x richer       0.033 0.021 
       (0.321) (0.355) 
Orphan x richest       0.112 0.03 
       (0.436) (0.464) 
grandparent     -0.100   -0.17 
     (0.050)   (0.126) 
other relative     -0.075   -0.207 
     (0.059)   (0.112) 
Constant 0.055 0.012 -0.008 0.007 0.01 0.086 0.085 0.128 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.051) (0.060) (0.061) (0.049) (0.049) (0.054) 
Observations 6029 6029 5985 5985 5880 6029 6029 5923 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0364 0.0365 0.0361 0.0366 0.037 0.0613 0.0612 0.0614 
No. of households      4025 4025 3965 
See notes to Appendix Table A1A for explanation.  
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Table B1: Description of 4 Cash transfer demonstrations in ESA 
 Mozambique Kenya Zambia Malawi 
Program Food Subsidy Program 
Cash Transfer 
Program for OVC 
Kalomo Pilot Social 
Cash Transfer Scheme 
Mchinji Social Cash 
Transfer Scheme 
Source of 
Funding Government 
UNICEF, DFID and 
Government Government and GTZ UNICEF and Government 
Executing 
Agencies 
The National Institute 
for Social Action 
(INAS) under the 
Ministry of Women 
and Social Action. 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
and the National AIDS 
Control Council 
Ministry of Community 
Development and Social 
Services 
Department of Poverty and 
Disaster Management Affair, 
implemented by Mchinji 
District Assembly. 
Objective 
Support entitlements 
to food by raising the 
household income 
Provide households 
caring for orphans with 
financial support. 
Reduce extreme 
poverty, hunger and 
starvation in the most 
destitute and 
incapacitated (non-
viable) 10% of 
households in the region 
Empower the poor to 
contribute to social and 
economic growth 
Target Group 
Eligibility determined 
by age, means 
testing (monthly 
income below USD 
30) and health status 
(disability, chronically 
sick) 
Households caring for 
OVC. 
Elderly-headed 
households that care for 
orphans and other 
vulnerable children 
(OVC) 
Ultra poor and work 
constrained households 
Geographic 
distribution 
Urban and peri-urban 
areas with planned 
expansion to rural 
areas 
17 districts chosen on 
the background of the 
highest prevalence OVC 
Pilot limited to in the 
Kalomo District 
Pilot initiated in the Mchinji 
District and expanding to 5 
other districts in 2008. 
Number of  
people reached 75,000 12,500 OVC 3,500 households 4200 households 
Value of 
Transfer (USD) 
USD 4 per month for 
one person 
households to a 
maximum of USD 12 
per month for 5+ 
households 
Ksh 1,500 per family per 
month. 
USD 10 per month for 
households without 
children; USD 12 for 
households with children 
1 person hh 4 USD, 2person 
hh 7 USD, 3person hh 10 
USD, 4+person hh 13 USD 
Source; UNICEF-ESARO (2008) 
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Figure C1: Proportional Increases in Per Capita Consumption, by decile 
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Mean Increase in Per Capita Consumption, by decile (Malawi)
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Figure C1: Proportional Increases in Per Capita Consumption (cont.) 
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Figure C2: Trade‐Offs in Beneficiary Proportions 
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Figure C2: Trade‐Offs in Beneficiary Proportions (cont.) 
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